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Phrenology vindicated

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PHRENOLOGY VINDICATED,

*Presented by
J. L. Peters*

IN A SERIES OF REMARKS,

PHYSIOLOGICAL, MORAL AND CRITICAL,

ON ARTICLE VII, OF THE NOVEMBER NUMBER, 1834,

OF THE

"CHRISTIAN EXAMINER,"

HEADED

"PRETENSIONS OF PHRENOLOGY EXAMINED."

✓
BY CHARLES CALDWELL, M. D.

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PHRENOLOGY VINDICATED.

THE very title of this paper is exceptionable, the use of the term "*Pretensions*" being tantamount to an insinuation that Phrenology possesses no *realities*. We doubt not, moreover, from the character of the production, that it was so intended.

Such a heading has in it much more of insidious artfulness, than of sound sense or manly wisdom, and is unworthy alike of a liberal inquirer and an honest and high-minded advocate of truth. The writer's object in framing it cannot be mistaken. Conscious of his own insufficiency to handle his subject, or of the badness of his cause, or of both united, he had recourse to *cunning*, the low intriguer's substitute for *talent*, and resolved to avail himself of such petty and discreditable advantages, as may accrue from the time-worn manœuvre of giving an adversary an odious name, when all other means of vanquishing him appear hopeless, or have already failed. But he is welcome to the gains of this and

every other shuffle of diplomatic policy he can call to his assistance; and he needs them all. When justice and ability are wanting in a contest, stratagem must be resorted to as the pillar of strength. His device, however, in the employment of the above *term of disrespect*, is as weak as it is ignominious. No one can possibly suffer from it but himself. As a trick habitually practised by the disingenuous and designing, it is too shallow to deceive the intelligent, and too stale to be relished by any one. It shall be passed by, therefore, without further notice. When grave matters are on hand, there is no time to toy with trifles, or make war upon shadows. And, in the present contest, the Rev. author of the Article before us will find something else necessary for the attainment of his end, than taunting terms calumniously employed.

If Phrenology be destined to fall (which we believe to be impossible, truth being as immutable and immortal as its AUTHOR) it must be overthrown by pertinent facts and solid arguments, wielded by powerful and dextrous opponents. Mere vocables feebly dripping from the lips of impotency, whether they are the vehicles of spurious wit, fierce denunciation, or unseemly abuse, will be unavailing, and, for the sake of literary taste, and the decency and harmony of social life, not to refer to higher motives, ought to be abandoned—or the perpetrators of such abuses should be held up, as the penalty of their offences, to public scorn. A fortress composed of stanch materials, and defended by resolute spirits and sturdy hands, does not yield to bustle and bluster. Nor will Phrenology be carried by all the fanatical crusades of parade and clamour, that can be waged against it. It stands on the rock of truth; and the ramparts thrown around it, by the skill of its champions, are far different from *Jericho-walls*. They will not crumble into ruins at the din of *priest-blown trumpets*, or any other *more senseless form of consecrated braying*. We refrain from any personal application of these remarks. Should the reader, however, in the course of our discussion, find ground for such application of them by himself, the fault will not be ours. The event will show that the thoughts have fitness in them.

It is not our intention to animadvert on all the reprehensible points, and fallacious views that make up the demerit of the Article in mass. That would impose a task on us far beyond the compass of the few pages we can devote to it. A volume would hardly afford us sufficient room. Without saying that the Article is throughout a repulsive compound of fallacies and faults, unrelieved by a valuable thought, we do say, that the number of the former it contains is, for its length, unprecedently great, and that nothing of the latter character in it has yet appeared to us. We shall select, for examination, only a few prominent errors and outrages on truth and decorum, yet not perhaps the most prominent, (for it is difficult to award supremacy in fault, where all are supreme,) leaving to the reader's imagination the doom of the others. Nor need he be exceedingly chary in the exercise of it. There is but little danger that his condemnation will be too deep. The Article being, from beginning to end, in harmony with itself as respects demerit, the entire composition may be satisfactorily judged of, from the parts we shall extract.

Of the first three pages we have nothing to say. As they have no immediate bearing on Phrenology, it is matter of indifference to us, in the capacity of its advocates, whether their contents be true or false. Their author composed them, to make a show of his *reading*, as the ostentatious bully, making his *debut* in the ring, shouts and brandishes his fists, to induce a belief that his spirit is courageous, and that his blows will be terrible. And we are willing to concede that he *may* have read—perhaps *extensively*—for the mind, like the body, is not always nourished and invigorated in proportion to the amount of provender it consumes. On the contrary, as the most intemperate gormandizers of flesh have often the *meagerest* bodies, so the minds of book-cormorants are not unfrequently in a *similar* condition. But though we admit that his Reverence “*may* have read,” yet we fearlessly add, that he might acquire, in a few hours, all the lore he has here paraded so pompously, and with an air so erudite.

Be his book-learning, however, what it may, if the tree is to be judged of by its fruit, he is neither rich in sound knowledge, versed in philosophy, nor able in argument—but the reverse—all which will hereafter appear. We shall only add, by way of preliminary, that, except some dashes of mystical cant about “faith,” “regeneration,” “love of God,” and a few other matters equally irrelevant, his objections to Phrenology contain nothing new. They make the hundredth edition, without the slightest improvement, of a stale and silly story, that has been going the round of reviews and newspapers, and of the tongues of witlings, beldams and gossips, for the last thirty years; and which has been exposed and refuted times innumerable. The chief difference we observe between him and his predecessors is, that he is the more flat and feeble, impudent and insulting, and deals more sickeningly in the slang of saintship, and the affectation of wisdom. We think his misrepresentations are also more numerous, gross, and reckless. Nor can we extend our charity so far, as to believe them *accidental*. *They are entirely on one side of the question, being all unfriendly to Phrenology.* Not a single mistake is made *in favour of the science*. This creates something more than a suspicion, that the misrepresentations are *intentional*. Were it declared to amount to *proof of the fact*, the declaration would be neither unnatural nor extravagant.

In the fourth and fifth pages of the Article appear the following clauses, which, besides being unfounded as to matter and sentiment, are offensive in manner and language, and therefore eminently unfavorable to the reputation of their author. They are discreditable alike to his sagacity and information, in common with his temper, candour, and breeding as a writer. Though these charges are heavy, they are amply sustained by the passages we shall quote.

“It” (Phrenology) “is evidently of the *Sensual School*, and must be considered as belonging to the *lowest order* of that School. It is, in fact, a system of *pure materialism*.” * * * * *

“The Phrenologist may profess, if he pleases, that he is not

a *Materialist*; such a profession is nothing to the purpose, except to prove, that his instinctive good sense is truer than his philosophy;—but when he asserts that Phrenology is not Materialism, he shows himself *utterly deficient in logic*, and renders his whole system *ridiculous*. Phrenology is Materialism.”

Such is the tone, in which this conceited “son of thunder” lets off his explosions, and such the foul imputations and insolent language, in which, with an utter disregard of truth, and an equal want of christian mildness and gentlemanly bearing, he indulges towards the entire School of Phrenology. And of whom is that School composed, that he should thus maliciously presume to disparage it? Of philosophers and men of all professions, many of them ranking with the most distinguished of the age, whether regard be had to their talents, science, learning, morals, or religion, or to the extent of the services they have rendered to their race. We are not to be informed, that personal comparisons are usually deemed exceptionable, and therefore condemned. Regardless of this, however, in a case like the present, we “assume the responsibility” of assuring our Rev. author, that we could name hundreds of Phrenologists, contrasted with either of whom, he would appear to little advantage, in any of the loftier attributes of character. In such a contrast, he would but serve as a foil, to brighten their lustre. Yet are these benefactors of man, and ornaments of the world in its most illustrious period, (according to the decision of the *doer up of an Article of twenty pages*, and of what else we know not and care not,) “utterly deficient in logic”—“ridiculous,” by reason of the “system of philosophy” they adhere to, and “pure materialists;” the latter affixing on them the damnatory charge of an entire want of morality and religion—for Phrenology is pronounced, from the same sapient and immaculate shrine, to be subversive of both. Nor is there any mitigation of the charge in the author’s subsequent attempt to make a distinction between the impiety of *phrenology as a system*, and of the *Phrenologist as a professor of it*—to show that the latter

may be *religious* and *innocent*, while the *former* is *irreligious* and *guilty*. The effort is fraught with silliness or hypocrisy; with the former, if the gentleman is sincere; with the latter if he is not. Phrenology and its advocates must share a common fate, be it good or evil. They are alike innocent or alike guilty; and our author but disgraces himself, by asserting the contrary. The assertion involves one of those foggy mysticisms, with which his writing abounds, (such as his distinction between "*reason*" and "*reasoning*,") and which no human discernment can penetrate. Will he contend that, though murder is a *crime*, the murderer is *not criminal*; or that, while theft is *felony*, the thief is no felon? We think not. His folly is hardly so ripe and rampant. Yet as well might he do this, as maintain that Phrenologists may be *pious* while they profess an *impious system*, and practise an *impious trade*; and do so surrounded by light and knowledge.

The foregoing passages, with many others in the Article, are so deeply imbued with the bitter and reprehensible spirit, that taints the reports of electioneering caucuses, and other political tirades of the day, that, as friends to literature and science, morality and truth, we regard them with no less of sorrow and alarm, than of indignation and abhorrence, and pronounce them disgraceful to the pages of a "*Christian*" Magazine. Coarse and offensive in manner, false in matter, and slanderous in tendency, as already stated, their admission into such a work is a breach of literary courtesy (to say nothing of the affront it offers to the taste and moral feeling of cultivated society) which may well be termed astonishing; and for which the proprietor of the Periodical should be compelled to make amends to an insulted public, or suffer in his interest, by the withdrawal of patronage. That such reckless condemnation has a shade of christianity in it, or is consistent with the spirit of piety, no one will affirm. On the contrary, that it presents a spectacle of hateful uncharitableness and rancorous dislike, few, we think, will deny. It is in fierce rebellion against the petition, "*Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive those that trespass against us*"! Why

then has the "Christian Examiner" converted itself into a "Bear Garden," and forfeited its title, by allowing its pages to become the scene of such unhallowed and *unchristian* conflict! Did we not, in this discussion, look to something beyond and above such unfounded imputation, so offensively expressed, our reply to it should consist in the silence of scorn. In itself, it is worthy of nothing further. But, for the sake of readers, whom its fallacy might delude, and its intemperance inflame, we shall make a few further remarks on it.

First, however, we frankly declare, that we consider the entire stream of declamation and invective, so constantly and intemperately poured out against materialism, as nothing better than empty abuse, deriving no countenance from fact or reason, philosophy or common sense, and absolutely destitute of a definite meaning. And to this belief we have been driven by the many shallow and unintelligible diatribes on the subject, to which we have listened. Of this description have been nearly all the discussions of it we have ever heard, and all the discourses and essays on it we have ever read. Nor have we found, in the Article, any thing to convince us, that its author's views are either clearer, better defended, or more satisfactory, than those of others, who rail senselessly, and talk by rote.

According to the broad idea usually attached to the term, no man of intelligence is now, or ever has been a materialist. To this, Mirabaud himself was no exception; nor is the deluded but philanthropic Visionary of Lanark. Neither of these sceptics contends, that the common gross matter, which we eat and drink, and of which the visible and tangible portion of our bodies is composed, is capable of thought. Nor can any Phrenologist, consistently with what he professes, ever be the advocate of a doctrine so preposterous. In becoming so, he would rebel against every principle and tenet of the science, and proclaim himself an apostate. Yet, one of the peculiar recommendations of that science is, that no one thoroughly acquainted with it has ever failed to become a believer in it; and, once a believer, no one has ever apos-

tatized from it. Gall and Spurzheim, the two Combes, with their able colleagues of the Scottish school, and all other distinguished Phrenologists, whether in Europe or America, pronounce the brain the *organ* of the mind. But have they ever said, or in any way intimated their belief, that the brain can feel, judge, reason, imagine, or perform a single operation denominated mental, without the aid of mind? Never. On the contrary, as often as they have spoken expressly on the subject, they have avowed their entire conviction that it cannot. The very fact, that they speak of the brain as the *organ of the mind*, is an acknowledgment by them that *mind exists*. True; they manifest much more modesty and diffidence, as to the amount of their knowledge, and the extent of their powers of penetration and conception, than the author of the Article. While the latter, according to his own "pretensions," would seem to have a perfect acquaintance with mind, they humbly confess their entire ignorance of it. They profess to know nothing of its nature, its abstract powers and attributes, nor even of the substance of which it is formed. But, both theoretically and practically, they admit its existence and action, as unequivocally as the Rev. author does. Nor do we hesitate to add, that they admit it under a much more reasonable and intelligible guise. Their view of it, in its connexion with the body, is *comprehensible*, and *reverential* toward the CREATOR. Our author's is *neither the one nor the other*, as we pledge ourselves to show, should the gentleman under his proper signature, invite us to the task, in an article soberly and decorously written, and manifesting in him a correct knowledge of the subject. *Ignorance and abuse* from him we shall not hereafter notice; nor would we have noticed them now, were it not that the Periodical, in which they have been *misplaced*, gives them a *factitious* but *perishable weight*.

Those who decry matter, as an unfit associate of mind, asserting that the former, by its own earthliness depresses the spiritual powers of the latter, and, on that ground, holding it in thralldom, limits its researches and attainments, and cur-

tails its enjoyments and efficiencies—those who do this (and they are numerous) not only speak of things they do not understand, but presumptuously censure the Deity for what he has done, calling in question his wisdom, power, or goodness, or all of them collectively. If any part of creation be defective, whether in substance, form, association, or any other way, the defect is imputable to Him, the production and arrangement of all things having been his own, no other being aiding or impeding him. But creation is as it ought to be; and those who express dissatisfaction with it, show their *own* imperfection, not that of the works of its AUTHOR.

It is not true, that, in their present connexion, matter is a hindrance to mind, in any of its operations. On the contrary, it is an indispensable aid to it, without which it would be functionless, and have no fitness for an agency on earth. Such, at least, is the import of every fact that bears on the subject. In their present state of union, mind can neither perceive, reflect, enjoy, nor suffer, independently of matter. It cannot see without an eye, hear without an ear, taste without a tongue, speak without the requisite organs, nor flex a joint without muscles. Nor is it accounted materialism to say so. Why then is it proclaimed materialism, to add, that it cannot judge and reason, without a brain? especially since the latter position is as susceptible of proof as the former. Nothing will so proclaim it but bigotry, and a superstitious adhesion to antiquated notions, which bar the mind from the knowledge of nature, and prolong the reign of ignorance and error. To put an end to doubt and cavil on this subject, let the brain be destroyed or seriously injured, and the mind can neither perceive, judge, reason, nor perform any other function, however *spiritual* and *independent of matter* it may be deemed. As relates to this world, the extinction of all mental action follows the extinction of action in the brain.

By all enlightened philosophers of the present day, every scheme of *abstract spiritualism*, as relates to man in his earthly capacity, is abandoned, and handed over to fanatics, sciolists and visionaries. Even the schools and the cloisters no

longer harbour it. The reason is plain. Such schemes are in direct opposition to all known and established facts. As a *pure spirit*, man neither performs nor can perform, a single act, terrestrial or heavenly. Assuredly, no such act can be designated. In his spiritual capacity alone, *he is not man*, any more than he is exclusively a spirit in his corporeal capacity. All he does is as a being compounded of mind and matter. He breathes as such, eats and drinks as such, feels as such, sees, hears and tastes as such, loves, hates, hopes and fears as such, speaks and walks as such, and sleeps, wakes, and thinks as such. Deny it who will, all this is common sense, and susceptible of proof.

Phrenology, then, is neither "pure materialism," nor pure spiritualism, but a compound of the two. So are all other, schemes of mental philosophy now in vogue—and indeed all comprehensible ones that ever were in vogue. And truth requires that they should be so. A system otherwise constructed would not now be received. The intelligence of the age would instinctively reject it, because it would be out of accordance with *nature*, and therefore discountenanced by the LIVING FOUNTAIN of all instruction. For nature is but an *issue* from THAT FOUNTAIN, the revealer of its secrets, the mirror of its perfections, and the dispenser of its bounties.

That Phrenology gives to the material portion of man a higher rank than most other systems of mental philosophy, is not denied. And it does so on substantial ground. That that portion is entitled to a higher rank than it has usually received, is a position which rests on indubitable evidence. Nor have the foes of Phrenology ever ventured to meet that evidence, with any other weapons, than cavil or evasion, denial or abuse. They have never soberly analyzed and inspected it, for the purpose of either refuting or confirming it. No wonder, therefore, that they are ignorant of its value. That they should have a correct knowledge of it, or duly prize it, would be much more marvellous. The result is, that they continue in voluntary ignorance themselves, rouse the hostile passions, and strengthen the repulsive prejudices, of

many, by their ill-tempered invectives, and, when other devices fail, mislead the public, by studied misrepresentations. Should we be told that these charges are of grave import, and ought not to be inconsiderately preferred; our reply would be, that our purpose is to make them so; but that their graveness does not surpass their truth—and that, in proof of the whole, recorded testimony, not to be questioned, can be amply adduced.

Finally; suppose Phrenology *were* favourable to the doctrine of materialism; on what ground does the writer feel authorized to empty his invectives and discharge his anathemas on it on that account? He derives no such authority from the *Scriptures*, which are *silent as respects the substance of mind*. They breathe not a suggestion as to what composes it. The Rev. gentleman affects to be a scholar, and perhaps is so. He should therefore know that the term *spirit*, to whatever language or root he may trace it, does not necessarily mean an *immaterial agent*. It means a very *subtle and etherialized agent*, whose essence perhaps consists in action. And, for aught man knows to the contrary, matter may be as susceptible of that form of being, as any other substance. Wise as our author thinks himself, he is not yet acquainted, nor is any one perhaps acquainted with all the qualities, nor even with all the kinds of matter that exist. Within the last fifty or sixty years many new kinds of matter have been discovered; nor is there any reason to doubt that others still remain unknown.

We gravely ask the Rev. writer, *Is immaterialism a christian doctrine? Is it derivable, we mean, from the precepts or discourses of the GREAT AUTHOR of christianity, or from the writings of any of the Apostles or Prophets?* And he will not jeopard what reputation he may possess, by answering in the affirmative. We, on the contrary, assert that it is a *pagan doctrine*, derived from the writings of the Grecian philosophers, chiefly from those of Pythagoras and Plato. Nor was it believed in or adopted by the *primitive christians*. In the course of the third or fourth century, (we forget which,) it

appears to have been first *interpolated* among the dogmas of the Church. And thousands of the most intelligent and pious divines of all ages and countries, have declined to consider it an established and necessary christian doctrine.

Nor has the doctrine of materialism any unfriendly bearing on that of the *immortality* of man. Matter is as immortal as spirit, unless its **AUTHOR** choose to destroy it (an event which revelation no where foretels,) and **HE** can destroy either of the two substances with equal facility. **HE** can also at pleasure, make the sentient and thinking principle of man out of the one, as readily as out of the other. Nor does any one know out of which of them he *has* made it. His entire perfection must be a source of conviction to every one given to reflection, that he has made it of that which is most suitable to its purposes here, and its destiny hereafter. And that is all we are privileged to know; nor need we investigate the matter any farther. The inquiry is nugatory, because it is transcendental. Still, we repeat, that there is no more of materialism attached to Phrenology, than to any other scheme of mental philosophy; a truth which no one of candour acquainted with the science will venture to deny.

We make these remarks, not because we are ourselves materialists. We advocate no such doctrine. Nor have we ever done so. Our only object is to expose the frivolity of the grounds, on which Phrenology is so fiercely assailed. And we wish further to show, that men in the assumed character of christians, denounce vindictively tenets which christianity does not disavow. Thus do they expose their ignorance, or make a mere engine of religion to subserve their own unhallowed purposes.—Our views and feelings on the subject are as follows. We believe that the Deity can make matter intellectual, *immortal* and *responsible*, if such be his pleasure. Nor do we know that he has not done so. Nor is knowledge to that effect possessed by any other mortal. In this matter, therefore, as in all others, we humbly bow to the secret ways of Heaven, without impertinently inquiring into them, or presumptuously questioning them. Much less

do we feel authorized FROM ABOVE, or in the slightest degree inclined to pass sentence of condemnation on those who may not think on the subject as we do.

Eager to avail himself of every pretext to quibble and condemn, our author attaches much weight to the two following passages, the first by Mr. Combe, the last by Dr. Spurzheim. "The mind, as *it exists by itself*, can never be an object of philosophical investigation." * * * * * "The doctrine of immaterial substances is not sufficiently amenable to the test of observation; it is founded on belief, and only supported by hypothesis."—We wish it to be understood, that we quote from the Article, without having examined the original works, to ascertain whether the extracts inserted in the former are correct. We receive them, therefore, as they are, and admit their accuracy, for the sake of the argument, though it will appear hereafter, that the writer's fidelity, even when he professes to report the opinions and statements of others, is to be but little relied on. One thing may be held certain. If the gentleman has departed from accuracy, it is to shape the matter more favourably to himself and his hypothesis.

From the two foregoing clauses, unequivocal as they are, and the truth of which no competent inquirer will gainsay, the Rev. author draws the condemnatory inference, that both Combe and Spurzheim are materialists, disbelieving, as connected with man, in the existence and agency of a spiritual being. Yet no inference can be more unwarranted; because none can be more at variance with the premises, from which it is drawn. Neither writer denies, either expressly or by implication, the existence of a mind or spirit in man. Mr. Combe, on the contrary, in the words, "*The mind, as it exists by itself*," plainly intimates his belief that it *does thus exist*. And Spurzheim is, if possible, still more explicit, in the following sentence. "Fenelon, for instance, would have been mild, amiable, innocent, benevolent and useful to his fellow-creatures under any church-government, *because his pure mind inhabited a pure body*." (See "Phrenology, or the Doctrine of the Mental Phenomena," Vol. II, p. 84, Boston Edition.)

And again; "In using the word organs, we mean only the organic parts by means of which the faculties of the mind become apparent, *but not that these constitute them,*" (the *faculties*.) (See same work, Vol. I, p. 22.) Other clauses no less explicit from each writer might be easily added.

To the apprehension, however, of every candid and intelligent reader, it must be plain, that, in the passages quoted, the authors did not mean either to affirm or deny the *existence* of mind. That point they regarded as already settled—and settled *affirmatively*, on grounds which they had no disposition to contest. They simply and *modestly* acknowledged their inability, so far to comprehend the nature and character of mind in the abstract, as to treat of it, as a subject of "observation," or a theme of philosophy. And the acknowledgement will be concurred in and adopted, as his own, by every enlightened and candid inquirer. None but empty pretenders, and self-sufficient philosophists will find fault with it. To allege that man can acquire, through his own *consciousness*, or in any other way, a sufficient acquaintance with his own spirit, or the spirit of another, to enable him to treat of it, as a subject of philosophy, betrays profound ignorance of the human constitution and economy, as well as of the scope, operations, and objects of the human intellect. Such knowledge is transcendental, and he who believes in his capacity to compass it, has never informed himself of the true limits of that capacity, nor of its unfitness for the study of *immaterial natures*. As well may it be contended that we can treat philosophically of other spiritual existences, as of our own minds; and that we might improve science and benefit the world, by plunging again into all the mystical absurdities of demonology and angelology, or rather of the *angelomania* of the Dark Ages.

In pronouncing Phrenology, then, a system of "pure materialism," the author of the Article speaks not only *without* evidence, but in *direct opposition to it*, and, unjustifiably, as well as discourteously, contradicts the statements, arraigns the motives, and assails the morals of some of the most worthy

and distinguished men of the age. That he is himself, in this measure, actuated by sinister motives, and that, in pursuing it, he does violence to sound morals, we shall not affirm; but we are much less prepared to deny or even doubt it. That he betrays offensive manners and a vindictive temper, in the matter, is obvious to every one.

In the following specimen of our author's logic, it is difficult to say, which is most conspicuous, his unfairness, or his imbecility. The two united present a compound repulsive and pitiable.

"The Phrenologist says, the organs" (of the brain) "do not constitute the mind. That we well know; but what are the organs? They are the *causes* of mental phenomena. What is the conclusion? *Evidently that there is no mind.*"

This extract is as untrue, as it is flippant and silly. Phrenologists have never pronounced the cerebral "organs the *cause* of mental phenomena;" nor do they so consider them. They believe and call them the *instruments* of such phenomena, and nothing more. This the author ought to know. If he does know it, he has *voluntarily* departed from truth, in representing it otherwise. If he does not, he ought to have informed himself of it, as well as of many other things with which he is unacquainted, by consulting phrenological writings, before having the temerity to become a writer himself. Of the dilemma thus presented to him, he may select the horn that best suits his taste. On one or the other his empalement is inevitable. The mass of ignorance and error, through which he flounders, in his attempt, real or pretended, to state facts and opinions, is astonishing, and his diffusion of false notions among his readers, highly culpable.

Nor is his reasoning, in the present case, less loose and illogical, than his representation is incorrect. The following is offered in the light of a comment on it, though it does not fully depict its absurdity. Without the aid of a piano, the music that issues from it could not be produced. But no one, on that account, calls the piano the "*cause*" of the music. It is the *instrument*; the *cause* being in the *musician*. Nor

will any one, except our author, draw from such premises, the incoherent "conclusion," that "there is evidently no" musician. What would the reader think of the following syllogism?—The fiddle does not constitute the fiddler. That we well know. What is the fiddle? It is the cause of the tune played on it. What is the conclusion? Evidently that there is no fiddler. Would he not pronounce such an attempt at ratiocination disgraceful foolery? Yes, certainly; nor would he meet contradiction. Yet, if our author's logic be any better, we are blind to the quality, in which its superiority consists. We are sensible, however, of a quality in it, which makes it much worse. It *falsifies*, as already intimated, in stating, that Phrenologists represent the cerebral organs as the "causes of mental phenomena." But when a syllogism has neither truth nor logic in it, to pronounce it only "disgraceful," is to speak mildly of it.

In page 254, of the Examiner, our author, waxing intemperate with holy zeal, or unholy hatred, or some new fangled sort of frenzied feeling, better suited to the occasion, and making a furious flutter to reach the sublime, misses his aim, and flounces into the ridiculous. Never did Pythianess, in her wildest mood, rave more triumphantly, or give vent to an explosion of words richer in clamour, or more beggarly in sense. In the motley records of *Pathos* and *Bathos*, invective and abuse, a more vainglorious, or bitterer, yet more harmless ebullition of a waspish temper, coupled with a barren intellect, it will be difficult to find. It reminds us, (to compare the *puny* with the *great*, and the *grovelling* with the *sublime*,) of one of those foulest and least splendid volcanic eruptions, where, instead of ponderous rocks, and gleaming lava, nothing issues from the sputtering crater, but sulphureous fume and water, mingled with the offensive dregs of the abyss.—In sober language; a more miserable and mortifying failure, in an attempt to clothe strength of thought and severity of invective in force and splendour of diction, we have never witnessed. The wit is spurious and pointless, the sarcasm flat and feeble, and the declamation empty fustian.

Worst of all, the spirit is rancorous, the design malicious, and the imputations untrue. Add, that some of the language is ribaldrous, as the following extract evinces, and the scandalous picture is complete.

“The beautiful region of mental philosophy is to be converted into a *barren Golgotha*, or *place of skulls*. Yes! *this ignoble doctrine*” (Phrenology) “*born of the dissecting knife and a lump of medulla, betraying at every step its mean extraction—this carnal philosophy, with its limited conceptions, its grey truisms, its purblind theories, its withering conclusions, and its weary dogmatism*, is to supplant the lofty faith of antiquity, and the sublime philosophy of the Bible, and to sit in judgment on the infinite and eternal! A great discovery has been made. It is ascertained that there is no indwelling spirit in man”—with much more of vulgar cant, and impudent rigmarole, unworthy of further notice. Nor would we have condescended to notice any portion of such a contemptible effusion at all, but for a resolution to make it recoil on its author, and teach him, what he does not seem to know, that imbecility finds its surest protection under the shade of obscurity, or behind the shield of modesty and decorum. Even the fangless serpent, and the worm without a sting, that infest our walks, and trouble our footsteps, deserve to be trodden on—and sooner or later they meet their doom.

We must not take leave of this portion of our author’s disgraceful flurry of words, without remarking, that the contemptuous manner in which he has spoken of the human brain, the most exquisite specimen of divine workmanship visible on earth, is irreverent towards its AUTHOR, not to call it *blasphemous*—“*A lump of medulla!*”—We have no words, that would not be exceptionable to cultivated taste, to express our abhorrence of such contumacious indecency. If the Rev. gentleman can repose in self-complacency, under such an indignity deliberately offered to the God he solemnly professes to adore, no language of ours could humble his audacity, or touch his flinty and hopeless insensibility. We

dismiss the subject, therefore, without further remark, and leave to the reader to make his own comments on it.

That the Medical Profession has been adorned by many moralists as pure, philosophers as enlightened, and christians as correct-minded and pious, as the world has produced, is a fact which history records to its honour. Yet, in his indiscriminate hostility toward all who are not as narrow-minded and fanatical as himself, our author utters against it the following slander.

“The brain is the organ of the mind. This is not a discovery of the Phrenologists. Nor do they claim it. The doctrine was advanced at a very early stage in medical science, and has been maintained by many *eminent anatomists and physiologists* ever since. Nor is it at all surprising that a philosopher of *this class* should be led to such a conclusion. *Dealing solely with matter, knowing nothing but matter*, and having found that many phenomena of human nature may be traced to organization, he naturally concludes that intellectual and moral phenomena are attributable to the same cause; and *having once fastened them on the flesh*, the brain, from the peculiarity of its structure and its situation with respect to other parts, is found a very convenient place for their location.”

Such is the Rev. author's compliment to the Medical Faculty. “A philosopher of *this class*”!—meaning the class of *materialists and infidels*—“*dealing solely with matter*”—“*knowing nothing but matter*”—“*having once fastened them*” (moral and intellectual phenomena) “*on the flesh.*” Such, we say, are the terms of contumely and reprobation, which the author of a twenty-page Article vents *directly* against “*eminent anatomists and physiologists,*” and *virtually* against physicians at large; for they all “*deal in matter*”—even in the “*lump of medulla,*” which has incurred our gentleman's pious anathema. Was ever more brazen effrontery practised! more unprincipled injustice attempted! or more heartless defamation uttered against a class of men, whose calling surpasses all others, in the streams of benevolence, charity, and practical good in

every form, which it diffuses through society! whose every-day business is to relieve distress, heal the sick, restore to the arms of affection and the field of usefulness, the young, the lovely, and the highly gifted, who seemed marked out for the grave; to assuage the sufferings of those they cannot save, dry up the tears of sorrow and affliction and elicit those of joy and gratitude in their place; and, in all ways they can devise, minister in kindness to those who are bowed down by the evils of life!—Such, we say, are the philanthropists and philosophers, who have incurred the malediction of our author, because they believe that the brain, on whose exquisite organization, its CREATOR has bestowed peculiar pains, serves as the immediate organ of the mind. This belief, steeped in the essence of the *unpardonable sin*, or *something worse*, converts them into infidels and disclaimers of immortality, makes them labour to “supplant the sublime philosophy of the Bible,” and renders them worthy of denunciation in this world, and of the punishment set apart for malefactors in the next!

Fortunately this doom is pronounced against physicians and Phrenologists only by the Rev. author of an Article as weak as it is virulent, his paternity to which he will sincerely repent, if he be not “proof and bulwark” against time, as well as against “sense.” Had this denunciation come down on us from respectable authority, we should have thrown it back, with the indignation it would have deserved. But, aware of the emptiness of its source, and, regarding it “more in pity than in anger,” we shall dismiss it with a single remark. It is not true, that any “eminent anatomists, physiologists,” or Phrenologists, that can be named, attribute “intellectual and moral phenomena” to mere organization. They all embrace, in their view of the causes productive of those phenomena, a living spirit or principle, by whatever name it may be known, or of whatever substance formed, by which the organization is quickened and thrown into action. Without such a principle, organized matter is as lifeless and destitute of morality and intellect, as that which is unorganiz-

ed. With it, it is instinct with life, and prepared to act, organization only deciding the form of action. For it is an axiom in physiology, that living matter necessarily acts conformably to its organization. The Phrenologist, then, has not made the "great discovery," "that," in the affected cant of the Article-writer, "there is no *indwelling* spirit in man." He believes in such a spirit, and *professes* his belief. But, less conceited than the writer, he avows himself unacquainted with its nature and abstract powers, and confesses his inability to make them subjects of observation and reason. He constructs his portion of the temple of science out of acknowledged facts, and fair *inductions*, not out of the froth of conjecture, or the fume of fanaticism. Nor is there, in his doctrine of mental operations, a single element that ought to affix on it the charge of materialism, in a higher degree than that charge rests on other doctrines on the same subject. For every scheme of mental philosophy must embrace matter as well as mind, else it is a mere visionary creation, without intelligibility, substance, or form. Even the author himself is so far a materialist as to admit (see C. Examiner, p. 256,) that some of the mental "*faculties and propensities are determined by cerebral developments.*" He is so far, therefore, identified with the Phrenologist, and must bear his proportion of the anathemas here, and of the pains and penalties hereafter, to which he dooms the supporters of the doctrine. Such is the inconsistency between his profession and practice, and such the result of his engaging in a discussion, to which he is unequal. One word more in defence of the Medical Faculty, from the slanderous charge, that they "deal solely in matter, and know nothing but matter." Some of the ablest metaphysicians the world has produced, were *physicians*. In proof of this, it is only necessary to mention the names of Locke and Brown. Though these gentlemen were regularly bred to medicine, as "anatomists and physiologists," and therefore "dealt in matter," in common with their professional brethren, our author will hardly contend, that they *knew and thought of nothing else*. Yet his doing so would be

only in keeping with his other misstatements. Even Aristotle, whose father was a physician, was evidently in possession of a *medical education*; nor is it at all certain, that he was not, for a time, a member of the profession.

We would here remark, that in discharging his clumsy invectives and sarcasms on Phrenology and its advocates, our Rev. calumniator seems to have taken Mr. Jeffery of Edinburgh as his pattern. Vain and presumptuous being! Such inflated pretension in one of such scanty resources and feeble powers reminds us of the monkey, that, in the absence of the philosopher, hopping upon Newton's table, to imitate and assist him in his astronomical labours, emptied the contents of an inkstand on one of his finest plates of diagrams. The groundless and unworthy attacks on Phrenology by Mr. Jeffery were protected from contempt by the vigour with which they were made, and the wit that often accompanied them. But those by our author, being as dull and imbecile as they are low and indecent, have no redeeming quality.

Another example of the gentleman's want of penetration and judgment is thus exhibited. "In vain would the Phrenologist distinguish between the *manifestations of the mind, and the mind itself.*" The plain English of this passage (if indeed it has any) is, that a faculty of the mind, or the organ of a faculty, with its *mode of action*, which makes up its manifestation, is *identical with the mind itself to which it belongs*, and cannot therefore be distinguished from it!—in other words, that the action and the thing acting, the effect and its cause are the same!—the tune cannot be distinguished from the musician and the instrument producing it!—nor the rain from the cloud, which distils it on the earth! Such is the edifying caste of our author's scheme of mental philosophy, and the tenor of his newly invented logic! But, thank Heaven! such is not the "sublime philosophy of the Bible," which Phrenologists are accused of conspiring to "supplant." That volume is as free from such silly inconsistencies and broad absurdities, as it is opposed in principle to the spirit that here dictates them, and the views with which they are uttered.

They are the misshapen and starveling growth of his own mind. Indeed we are willing to believe, that no portion of his views is derived from any *external source*, because they resemble nothing but themselves. Whatever may be his *professions* and *pretences*, the writer does not draw on that high and venerable source (the Bible) for either *precept* or *practice*. In the latter respect, he violates not a few of its most sacred injunctions, and, instead of "*blessing* those that *curse* him," and "*doing good* to such as *despitefully* use him," he does all the mischief his limited powers enable him to do, to those who never injured him, but are earnestly labouring to instruct and benefit him, as an *uninformed* and *deluded* member of the human family. We acquit him therefore of plagiarism, and freely concede to him, as the issue of his own travail, all he has said, without abatement or reservation. Nor need he entertain the slightest apprehension, that any one will act the plagiarist on him. Not half so secure is the miser's wealth, within the iron ribs of his strong-box, as are the treasures of his Article, beneath the sevenfold casement of absurdity that surrounds it.

But the whole extent of his outrage on truth and candour is yet far from being exhibited.

"The mind" (he asserts) "has *absolutely and professedly* no place in the system" of Phrenology. Yet, in direct contradiction of this, he *virtually* admits soon afterwards, or before (no matter which) that the Phrenologist does "*profess*" at least, "that he is *no materialist*," and of course that he believes in the existence of mind. But let this pass; the gentleman's inconsistencies are sufficiently multiplied and glaring without it, to blight beyond redemption his character as a writer.

But we have as yet represented him only in the *commencement* of his career. In the progress of it, he avers, with a disregard for truth, which nothing can either palliate or surpass, that, instead of mind, and, of course, as a *substitute* for it, the Phrenologist takes

"Into his consideration, a mass of cineritious and medullary matter called brain, to which *all intellectual and moral phenom-*

ena are referred. Consequently the manifestations, of which he speaks, are *manifestations of this cineritious and medullary substance*, and he has no authority whatever for calling them *manifestations of the mind*. He has found what he deems a *sufficient cause for the phenomena* in question, and it is altogether unphilosophical to speak of any other."

It is difficult to decide which is the more striking, the *puerility* or the *mendacity* here exhibited. We have used the strong term "mendacity," from a conviction, that, if the writer has ever examined the subject, and is in his *sober senses*, he *neither does nor can* believe what he has explicitly stated. Yet to make the statement, in the face of his positive knowledge to the contrary, bespeaks such a wanton abandonment of truth and moral principles as cannot be imputed to any one, who is not lost to character and conscience, and callous to shame. He has but to make his choice, therefore, between disgraceful ignorance, and deliberate falsehood. To speak thus of a clergyman is painful to us; but a sense of violated duty would render silence more painful. Through means devised and put in action by himself, untruth is abroad; and it is designed to injure the reputation and degrade the standing of a class of men, who, we say again, are distinguished alike for intellect and morals, and are zealously labouring in the cause of truth, and for the benefit of their race. Such benefactors of mankind deserve protection; and, as far as our exertions may avail, they shall receive it, though we encounter, in the conflict, the *surplice* and the *cassock*. We repeat, therefore, that, *assert* it who may, it is not true, that Phrenologists are either compelled by their doctrine to refer, or that they do refer "intellectual and moral phenomena" to mere cerebral organization. They refer them to such organization employed as an *instrument* to work with, by a *quickenings and actuating principle*; no matter of what substance that principle may be formed, or by what name it is known. Its substance and nature are concealed from us; and, as to its name, whether *mind*, *spirit*, *animus*, *pneuma*, or *psyche*, it is an *arbitrary sound*, intended to designate some subtle ethereal nature, about

which nothing but ignorance or pedantry will wrangle. Its *existence* and *immortality* are alone involved in the question; and the belief of Phrenologists in *them* is honest and unwavering. For reasons already referred to, however, Phrenology does not treat of mind disconnected from matter. It considers it only in a *state of union*, and contends, that, in the exercise of *all* its faculties, during such state, it is associated with cerebral matter, and uses it as an instrument precisely as metaphysicians admit its association with the eye in vision, and with the ear in hearing, and the use it makes of those organs, as means to effect its purposes. Such is the habitual disregard for truth, or rather such is the spirit of *practical* falsehood, under which the opposition to Phrenology is conducted!

We have now reached that point in our authors pasquinade, which he seems to consider his citadel of strength, from the battlements of which he vaunts his prowess, and hurls his mimic thunderbolts, with the confident tone, and imperial air of a Jupiter Tonans. Goliath, too (the gentleman is doubtless familiar with the history of that blustering bully, else he would not so accurately copy him)—Goliath, too, vaunted his prowess, and vapoured and flourished his weapons terribly, and was yet easily vanquished by the simplest contrivance. In the cause, then, and under the banner of truth, we shall proceed to test, in a manner equally simple, the metal of the writer, and the strength of his fortress. To embrace all we design to examine under this head, our extract from the Article must be of some length.

“If he” (the Phrenologist) “admit that there is an immaterial agent, he cannot deny that that agent may act on itself, and, by such action, obtain a knowledge of its nature and relations—in short, that the metaphysician may speak on these subjects as well as the physiologist. As metaphysicians, then, arguing from *consciousness*, from reason, and reflection, we affirm that the brain is not the *sole organ of the mind*; that, on the contrary, many of the mental faculties are *wholly independent* of this organ.” * * * * * “When it is said

that the brain is the organ of the mind, one of two things is intended—either that the mind is *manifested by the brain*, or that it *operates through the brain*. If it be maintained that the mind *manifests itself* by means of the brain, we reply that a great portion of the mind's action is *not* manifested at all—which makes the brain so far useless; and that when the mind does manifest itself, it is, as every one knows, by means of the hands and feet, the lips, the eyes, &c., showing at least as great a dependence on these organs, as on the brain. If it be maintained that the mind *operates by means of the brain*, we throw the burden of proof on the physiologist, and demand *positive demonstration of the fact.*”

This extract, notwithstanding the spirit of dogmatism and arrogant confidence which pervades it, and the triumph which its author conceits he has achieved by it, is marked by such crudeness and imbecility of thought, such looseness and fallacy in the effort to reason, and such childish ignorance of the subject in question, as to be unworthy of a reply. We almost regret our reference to it, as being little else than a waste of time. Having been noticed, however, at all, some reply will probably be looked for, and must not therefore be withheld. It matters but little, however, which end or point we begin at. No one part of it depends on, or is sustained by, another. It is so heterogeneous in substance, if it really has any, and so disjointed in texture, that each proposition in it (if any thing in it can be so called) must stand alone, or fall alone, according to its doom. One fragment, in tumbling down, can overthrow another only by striking it; not because either had previously given the other any support. Such being the case, it is not necessary for us to be very methodical in our course of examining it. We shall therefore consider some of the latter notions contained in it first.

In respect to language, we are not inclined to be hypercritical. As the author of the article, however, has dealt much more in *words*, than in thoughts, it is not unreasonable to say, that he ought to have been correct in his use of them. In particular, as he has heretofore attempted to confound and

identify things that are different, he ought not now to endeavour, by different forms of expression, to create a belief that there exists a difference between things that are the same. Yet he has done so—perhaps unconsciously, his wish to *seem* wise, and to *be thought* discriminating, having surpassed his capacity to *be* so. He appears to think that there is a radical difference between the mind's "*manifesting itself by means of the brain,*" and "*operating by means of the brain,*" and lays no little stress on the distinction. In this he has ventured, as is his practice, beyond his ken, and entangled himself in a puzzle of his own creation. The mind *manifests* itself only by some mode of *operating on* and *by* matter, and its *operation* can be known only by the *manifestation* produced. Virtually and practically, therefore, *mental operation*, and *mental manifestation*, if not mutually convertible forms of expression, stand related as *cause* and *effect*, which suits our purpose just as well, as if they were synonymous. The mind, we repeat, during its union with our material portion, manifests itself only by operating *on* and *with* that portion. Operation therefore is the cause, and manifestation the effect. True; one mode of manifestation is more open and palpable to sense than another. To think and reason, to write and walk, to talk, sing, and hope, are all alike operations and manifestations of the mind. Some of them, however, are much more obvious and striking than others. Every one perceives the processes of writing, walking, and singing, because they consist in forms of action easily observed. Their *immediate* machinery is *external*—composed of parts on which the eye and the ear can rest, see their movements, and hear the effects of them. They have in them much of muscular and comparatively gross movement. Not so with reasoning, thinking, hoping, or any other sort of process, which, if permitted to coin a word for the occasion, we would call *mento-cerebral*; because they are the immediate product of the mind and the brain, extending but slightly to other parts of the body. Action of this kind is performed by an apparatus which is concealed, and whose movements are not therefore

matters of sense. Hence they are perceived only, or at least chiefly, in their remoter effects. True; to the minute and accurate observer, the eye, countenance, and whole attitude and aspect of a man engaged in deep thought, or lively hope, give clear evidence of the action of his brain. But, on loose and careless observers, of whom our author appears to be one, such evidence is lost. They notice nothing, except what is so palpable, that "he who runs may read." On subjects like the present, therefore, their testimony is of no value.

As already intimated, the *external* and *immediate* instruments of all striking manifestations of mind are the muscles. But, for their power to *act* and *manifest*, they depend on the brain. This, no physiologist will deny. Nor would our author, did not ignorance blind, or perversity and prejudice warp his understanding. The brain is as plainly the source of muscular motion, as the fountain is of the stream that issues from it, or the sun of the light and temperature of day. This is true of every form of voluntary motion, in whatever part of the body it may occur. Its origin is *mento-cerebral*, the muscles being the organs of manifest action. The eye is moved by muscles, which themselves move in obedience to cerebral influence. When the mind of the mechanist, therefore, engages in the invention and construction of a piece of machinery, it carries on a compound process. It operates first *on* and *with* the brain, in *conceiving* the machinery, and afterwards *on* and *through* different portions of the same organ, in employing the eyes and hands in *constructing* it. In each part of the process, then, the mind *operates immediately on* and *with* the brain, and, in the *outward* and *mechanical* part, *remotely on* and *with* the eyes and hands. And, in the whole operation, (the internal part no less than the external,) it *manifests* itself—exhibits, we mean, its existence and action.

In fine; when the mathematician is solving his problem, or the orator excogitating the matter of his address, the mind of each *operates* and *manifests* itself by his brain, as certainly, and, to the correct and enlightened observer, as clearly, as the mind of the soldier does by his hand and arm, when he

is wielding his sword, or that of the woodman, when he is plying his axe. The source of our author's error here is two-fold; his ignorance of the connexion of the brain with the other parts of the body, especially with the muscles and the external organs of sense, and its supremacy over them; and his inability to follow out a chain of sequences. In plainer terms, he knows nothing of anatomy and physiology; and he *cannot reason*. Nothing is more palpable, therefore, than his unfitness for the discussion, in which his conceit and officiousness have induced him to embark. Feeble in all the higher powers of mind, intellectual and moral, and unskilled in the exercise of them, he is strong only in his passions—especially the bitter and malignant ones. Hence the virulence and offensiveness of his expressions, which are the remote manifestations of his mind, made through the instrumentality of a badly balanced brain, whose *animal* organs greatly surpass the *human* ones in power. From his calumnies and aspersions of those who never injured him, nor even dreamt of his existence, his Secretiveness, Destructiveness, and Self-Esteem, would seem to rank as his master organs, and his *Conscientiousness is small*. Give him a brain, whose moral and reflecting organs preponderate, and he may then write like a man of sober sense, and a "christian" minister. But, with his present brain, unless greatly improved by well-directed and severe discipline, his case is hopeless. There will be too much reason to pass on him the fearful judgment, "Ephraim is given over to idols, let him alone!"

Another representation made in the extract, with all the confidence that self-awarded wisdom and pedantry can beget, is, that the mind "may act on itself, and, by such action, obtain a knowledge of its own nature and relations." This assertion is so enigmatical, that to reply to it definitely appears impossible. In making the attempt, therefore, we must speak at random. If the writer mean, that the human spirit can, by self-examination, so far penetrate and comprehend its own substance and nature, as to know that it is an *immaterial being*, capable of acting in the acquisition of knowledge and

its application to the purposes of life, *independently of the brain* (and if he does not mean this, nobody can tell what he means)—if such be the notion he intends to communicate, he is mistaken. The mind has no such power. Nor, as far as we are informed, does any mental philosopher of note, at this period, to whatever school he may belong, claim for it such a power. The claim is made only by smatterers and dogmatists, who substitute assertion for argument, and hypothesis for fact. The highest point the mind can attain, by self-examination, is a consciousness of its own existence and power to act. Of its nature and substance it can learn nothing. Nor is it possible for it to ascertain through that channel, whether it acts alone, or in connexion with the brain. This latter point of knowledge can be acquired only by means of observation directed to matter, spirit being beyond its reach, and far too subtle and ethereal for its grasp. And such means alone do Phrenologists employ. Leaving all matters of conjecture and assumption to their metaphysical opponents, they neither consume their time, nor disquiet their minds, in discussing the problem of *substance* and *essence*, convinced that such inquiries are transcendental and useless. Conscious that they possess a feeling and thinking principle, the work of a *Creator* of boundless perfection, they are satisfied that it consists of the substance most suitable to it, and is endowed with such qualities as best become it. Behind this point a veil is dropt, which they have not the temerity to attempt either to lift or penetrate. The estimate they set on *their* mental powers, in this matter, is humble; that which the author of the Article sets on *his*, overweening and presumptuous. It is he, not they, that would “sit in judgment on the infinite and eternal”! he, not they, that would fathom the essence and qualities of the mind, and demand of its CREATOR that it be made of a *given substance*; and, if not gratified in his demand, cavil and condemn. As respects the Deity and his works, it is he, not the followers of the modest Spurzheim, that would

"Snatch from his hand the balance and the rod,
 "Rejudge his Justice, be the God of God!"

In truth, he is a *pompous pretender*, who, too ignorant to know his inability, aims at discoveries far beyond his reach. As well may he assert, that his consciousness informs him of the *colour, weight and odour* of his mind, as of its "nature and relations." Consciousness is a mere *feeling*; and all feelings are *blind*—we mean as respects *ideas*. They inform simply of their *own existence*, and nothing more. Of the substance that feels, they give no information. Whether it is matter or spirit, a simple or a compound being, is concealed from them, and they, of course, can make no revelation of it. Our *love* informs us that we love, and nothing more; our *hatred*, that we hate, and nothing more; our *hope*, that we hope; our *fear*, that we fear; and our *conscientiousness*, that we have a sense of justice. But, of what substance or nature the being is, that loves, hates, hopes, and fears, they leave us ignorant. Nor does even Veneration, when exercised in homage toward the Deity, communicate to us any knowledge, respecting either the agent that worships, or the BEING that is worshipped. An acquaintance with these points must be sought through another channel. The truth of our remark, respecting the blindness of Veneration, appears from the fact, that, while all nations worship a God of some sort, no two of them, who have not a religion in common, worship the same God. Such is the doctrine now subscribed to, by every mental philosopher worthy of the name, and versed in the science as it now exists. Stronger still; such is the doctrine which accords with nature. We might safely add, that our consciousness does not even tell us that we see with the *eye* or hear with the *ear*. It simply informs us that we *see* and *hear*. A knowledge of the organs employed in those functions, we attain by observation and experience. In fine; two of the cardinal errors of the metaphysical school, and the source of most of its other errors are, its reliance on consciousness, as a source of knowledge, and its belief in the abstract spirituality of certain mental operations. Under the

influence of these notions, it is impossible for its efforts to be successful, or its productions sound.

Respecting our author's position, that the mind can "act on itself, and by such action, obtain a knowledge of its nature and relations," we shall only further observe, that the notion is not only unfounded, but preposterous. Were the mind composed of parts, it would be conceivable that one part *might* act on another. But, for a *simple being* to act on itself, is inconceivable, and, we might add, *impossible*. As well may a single particle of light, or any other uncompound portion of matter be said to act on itself; a paradox which no one will venture to sustain. It is often asserted that, in many cases, the *romance of history* is more extraordinary than *the romance of fiction*. And the occurrence of absurdities like that we are considering, proves that it is so. Had the error in question never been witnessed, it would never have been *imagined*—certainly not by us. To contend that a *simple substance* can "act on itself"—being at the same instant *agent* and *subject*—is as self-contradictory as to maintain that the same body can *at once be* and *not be*—or that two bodies can, at the same moment, occupy the same portion of space.

Once more. For one man to depend on his own consciousness for a knowledge of the faculties and mental character of others, is not only deceptive, but eminently absurd. Just as rationally would he consult his consciousness to learn whether other people are *hungry* or not—or whether they are in a *good* or a *bad humour*. Or as well might he look into his mirror, and attempt to sketch, from his own image, likenesses of the whole human family. Each man's consciousness is as exclusively his own, and as unlike that of others, as the form of his features, or the colour and expression of his eyes. Of course, it participates largely of his predominant faculties, and leans instinctively in that direction. Is Benevolence strong? the individual is conscious of his propensity to do kind actions. Do Veneration and Wonder predominate? He is conscious of a prevailing disposition to do homage to superior beings, to delight in romance, and to pay

marked observance to great and good men. Is Conscientiousness his ruling passion? He is conscious of an unwavering and ardent love of justice. Is Love of approbation? He is conscious of placing a high value on the esteem and admiration of his fellow-men. But no one is conscious of the mental condition of any body but himself. Nor can he acquire in this way an *accurate knowledge* even of his own character. He attains but an *indefinite feeling* of it. The reason is plain. He cannot bring his *intellectual* faculties, the *only source of his knowledge*, fully to bear on it. So little do we learn of the philosophy of mind, by consulting *consciousness*!

The author's affirmation "that the brain is not the *sole organ* of the mind; that, on the contrary, many of the mental faculties are wholly *independent of the brain*," is puerile, and bespeaks in the Rev. gentleman consummate ignorance, not merely of the human economy, but of some of the commonest events in the history of man. These independent "*faculties*," he afterwards tells us, are "*the will, faith, love of God, consciousness, reason, &c.*;" but how many more these "&c." include, he does *not* tell us—nor is it any matter. To make them include seeing, hearing, tasting, and muscular motion, would hardly swell the mass of his blunders. On the ignorance manifested in calling "faith, love of God, consciousness" &c. "*faculties*," when every school-boy in mental philosophy knows them to be only *functions*, or forms of action of faculties, we shall not dwell. When weighty faults are under consideration, lighter ones must be lightly handled. We shall only ask the gentleman, what becomes of his *independent* and purely *spiritual faculties*, "*reason, will, consciousness, faith*," and even "*love of God*?"—what indeed becomes of every mental faculty, when the brain is in any manner seriously injured?—when it is compressed, concussed, apoplexed, or irritated to frenzy, or ferocious madness? Are these *faculties* in full existence and sound exercise then? Even *he* will not so far fill up the measure of his folly, as to answer affirmatively. No; under the cerebral derangements referred to, his "*spiritual faculties*" are also deranged, or *entirely extinct*. We

speak in relation to *this world*; and Phrenologists have not the presumption to attempt to fathom the *things of another*. Regarding *them* as *essentially, at present, a part of the unknown*, they leave them to the scrutiny of *wiser beings*, or of a *wiser period of their own being*. Nor will they receive as an instructor, in *matters of eternity*, the author of the Article, who knows so little of the *matters of time*. We need scarcely add, that were the “faculties” specified exclusively “*spiritual*,” and *independent of the brain*, they would not be impaired or obliterated by its derangements. Were the flower independent of the stem on which it grows, it would not wither, when that stem is cut down; nor would the stream fail when the fountain is dried up, or become foul, when it is disturbed, if it did not depend on it for the supply and purity of its water. We shall only farther, under this head, express our surprise that the anti-phrenologists and metaphysicians, not only without the evidence of facts, but in opposition to it, persevere in their assertion, that some mental faculties and functions are more *spiritual* than others—as if the mind were not consistent with itself—as if one portion of it were *purely spiritual*, and another portion but *partly* so. When they shall have adduced in support of this notion any thing deserving the name of argument, we pledge ourselves to reply to it by argument. But their mere allegation, which we hold to be purely visionary, we shall meet only by a plain denial. One mental faculty is of a higher order than another; but they are all alike in spirituality, and also alike in their dependence on matter. They all conform to the constitution of man, which consists of matter as well as mind.

A proposition singularly paradoxical, or eminently silly is now to be noticed. “A great portion of the mind’s action,” says the writer, “is not manifested at all.”—Not manifested at all! What evidence have we, then, of its existence? To *manifest* is to *make appear*, or, in some way, to *make known*. If action, therefore, neither appear, nor be, in any manner, made known, on what ground is it *called* action? or how can it be said to exist? *Not to be manifested*, and *not to be*, are

here synonymous forms of expression. Hence the writer is either enigmatical or self-contradictory in his language; we shall not trouble ourselves to determine which. More probably still, his ignorance of his subject has betrayed him into expressions that have no meaning. This we think the more charitable construction; for it is less culpable to have no meaning than an unworthy one. And in a case so equivocal as the present, charity should be consulted and listened to. But another clause of the extract, perhaps even more preposterous, calls for a remark.

“When the mind does manifest itself, it is, as every one knows, by the hands and feet, the lips, eyes, &c. showing at least as great a dependence on these organs, as on the brain.”

Can the gentleman be serious in the notion here expressed? or does he mean it as a taunting jest, or a mark of disrespect levelled at Phrenology? If the former, he is a shallower ignoramus than we thought him; if the latter, a more impudent trifler. He may choose, in the alternative for himself. We apprehend he has never seen any one manifesting mind, *without* a brain; though he has some knowledge of an individual, who manifests it very miserably *with* one. We, however, have known persons, possessing neither “hands” nor “feet,” and some destitute of “eyes,” who, notwithstanding, manifested mind much better, than a certain anti-phrenological writer we could name, who possesses, in sufficient perfection, every part of the system, *except* brain. But we must not run the risk of disgusting the reader, by noticing any further such contemptible silliness.

In the vehemence of his denial, that “consciousness, faith, love of God, and reason” are manifested through the instrumentality of the brain, our author observes, “nothing less than *absolute demonstration* will convince us of the fact. The only way to demonstrate this point would be, to show the brain in the act of performing these functions.” Here, as in every other part of his Article, he gives “absolute demonstration” of his own entire ignorance of physiology, and of his being a man, if not of *mere and exclusive perception*, pos-

sessing at least in a very humble degree the *powers of reason*. His position, plainly expounded, is, that he believes nothing which is not, or which cannot be, *shown* to him; in other words, made palpable to one or more of his *senses*. The sphere of his belief, therefore, is exceedingly circumscribed. Has it ever been *demonstrated* to him that the mind exercises, or possesses these "faculties," *in its insulated capacity*? Has he ever seen, or heard, or felt its movements, or has he in any other way been made sensible of them, when it was in the immediate act of "consciousness, faith, reason," or when doing any thing else? And was it, at the time, demonstrated to him, that the movements belonged *exclusively to the mind*, the brain having no participation in them? No certainly; nor will he himself answer these questions in the affirmative. According to his rule of evidence, then, he must apostatize from his faith in the abstract spirituality of those "faculties;" for the truth of the hypothesis is not *demonstrated*. Will he contend that his "consciousness" comes to his aid, and gives him evidence which confirms him in this belief? But consciousness is itself one of his "*spiritual faculties*." It must therefore testify to its own origin. Consciousness must so far ascertain the lineage of consciousness, as to be able to "*demonstrate*" to him that its descent is purely spiritual. Nor is this all. It must do the same with respect to "faith, reason, and love of God." As those "faculties" can do nothing, in that way, for themselves, consciousness must collect *demonstrative* evidence of the abstract spirituality of each and all of them. Such is the train of sophistry our author must pursue in support of his notion; and it is *unqualified nonsense*. He has evidently no correct knowledge of the nature and operations of consciousness, if indeed it can be said to operate. We abandon this discussion, therefore, for something less deeply involved in mysticism and absurdity.

The gentleman believes nothing that is not "*shown*" to him. Has it ever been shown to him *demonstratively*, that the blood which flows to any organ of the body, actually nourishes that organ? Has he ever seen the movements of the

nutritive vessels in the "act of performing their functions"; or has any body else seen them and described or reported them to him? No. Has he, or any one else seen the movements of the secretory vessels of the liver, in the "act" of secreting bile, of the kidneys in secreting urine, or of the salivary glands in secreting saliva? No. Does he therefore deny that the nutritive vessels do nourish the organs, and the secretory vessels secrete their fluids? No; he must acknowledge both. Why, then, does he require to be shown the movements of the brain, in the "act of performing its functions," before he will believe that it does perform them? The cause is plain. His prejudice and superstition, united to his animosity against Phrenology, have perverted his intellect, or, so far as that science is concerned, suppressed its action. From the inconsistency, in which he has thus entangled himself, on the present point, no device can extricate him. Hemmed in, on every quarter, and too weak to defend himself, he must surrender at discretion. According to the terms and tenor of his creed, he must renounce his belief, if he ever entertained any, in secretion, nutrition, absorption, calorification, and all other purely organic functions, because he cannot have *demonstrated* to him the movements of the capillary vessels in the immediate "act of performing them." He must also disbelieve in the *organic* performance of the external senses, because he cannot detect the minute movements of the eye in vision, of the ear in hearing, of the tongue in tasting, of the nose in smelling, or of the fingers in feeling. He must, in fact, disbelieve every thing not *ocularly demonstrated*, and therefore reject moral science by the lump, as well as whole branches of physical science, because they are wanting in such demonstration. Phrenology is the anatomy and physiology of the brain *acted on by*, and *acting with*, the mind; in other words, performing its functions under the influence of the mind. Did our author understand it, therefore, and were he a judge of evidence, he would find as substantial testimony in favour of it, as in favour of the physiology of any other part of the body. For, in physi-

ology generally, reason must be consulted, as well as sense, that science embracing much that is not subject to the immediate action of the senses.

After all; admitting the objection of our author to be preferred on reasonable ground, and to be unexceptionable as to the spirit that prompted it, it does not constitute, in the path of Phrenology, so serious an obstacle as he imagines and wishes. *The action of the brain, under the processes of feeling and thought, can be "shown" to him.* This he would have known, had he informed himself on the subject, as he might and ought to have done. In several cases where portions of the hairy scalp and of the cranium and dura mater had been removed, the denuded brain has been observed to be tranquil, during sound sleep, somewhat agitated during dreams, and the more vivid the dream, the greater its agitation. Under wakefulness the commotion was higher still; and highest of all, when thought was active, and emotion deep. On the author's own terms, therefore, the agency of the brain, in "intellectual and moral phenomena", has a stronger claim on his belief, than the processes of secretion, nutrition, calorification and absorption. Under neither of the latter is the action of the capillaries perceptible.

It is correctly alleged by Phrenologists, that, in cases of excessive mental labour, some form of pain, fatigue, or uneasiness is felt in the cerebral organ that is over-exercised. This our author denies, on the ground of his own "experience," *modestly enough* making himself a measure, in this respect, for the whole human race—the *highly gifted* portion of it not excepted. Against this mode of reply, by the gentleman, we gravely protest. His own "experience" may be a very proper standard to measure his own brains by, and that of others similar in developement and endowment, both as to their exercise and feeling, size and productions; nor shall we complain of its being so employed. But Heaven forbid that it be erected into a Procrustean bed, for the admeasurement of all men's brains! That would open a scene of lopping and compressing, such as the world has never witnessed.

The practice of the Caribs and other *Flat-heads* would be mercy compared to it; and the change in mankind produced by it would be a fearful retrogradation from millennial perfection. Nor do we think it likely that society would willingly submit to such a "reform," but would be better satisfied with things as they are. To those persons, therefore, whose brains are far different from the brain of our author, and who think with greater intensity and force, he will not, we presume, deny the privilege of feeling for themselves, though their feeling should be different from his, or even contrary to it. As he relies on *his* "experience," it is but reasonable that they should be allowed also to rely on *theirs*. They have, moreover, as high a claim, as he has, to be *believed* on their word, and are as capable of consulting their "consciousness," and reporting its decision. When such characters, then, deliberately assert, that they *have* felt lassitude and uneasiness in given cerebral organs under intense exercise, their representation is entitled to credit, notwithstanding the gentleman's assertion that *he* has *not*. Nor is the reason of his destitution of such feeling a secret to any one who has looked into his writings. The fruit reveals the character of the tree. As already intimated, he is a feeble thinker, because his brain is a feeble instrument. No wonder, therefore, that under such defective cerebral action, he should experience no cerebral uneasiness. On this ground, however, he is not authorized to infer, that the same is true of men possessed of vigorous brains. The swift-footed stag and the steed that pursues him soon exhaust themselves by the intenseness of their action; while the clumsy dodo and the phlegmatic sloth are strangers to fatigue. As well might the gentleman contend, that, because he has never given birth to a splendid thought, fathomed and mastered the profounds of science, nor constructed a powerful chain of argument, neither has any body else, as pretend to measure the strength or sensitiveness of other men's brains by the feebleness or apathy of his own. We believe there are few severe students and intense thinkers, who do not concur in this, that, after a

laborious and long continued investigation of a given subject, they experience an uncomfortable, if not a painful sensation in a given part of the head; and that that sensation soon vanishes, under mental relaxation, or is removed by a different form of study. Indeed what is termed "relaxation" is often nothing else than a resort to a new sort of mental action; as from the study of mathematics to the study of language, from that to the study of music, and from that again to the study of painting or poetry. By such changes the brain is freed from unpleasant feeling, and the fatigued faculties refitted for the relinquished pursuit.

The Rev. gentleman's remark, which he no doubt thinks vastly clever, perhaps brilliantly witty, about "that populous little" (Phrenological) "colony situated just over the eyes," is pert and vulgar—much better suited to the tenant of the kitchen or the stable, than to the occupant of a pulpit. None but a *petit maitre* in mind and a *clown* in feeling and manners, whatever may be the colour or quality of his coat, would resort to such mental harlequinism, especially in the discussion of a doctrine, which is deeply engaging and powerfully agitating the philosophical world, and shaking to their centres all preceding systems of the philosophy of mind. But so it is; every one will obey his *ruling passion*, and exercise habitually his master-faculty. He that cannot reason, therefore, when engaged in a controversy, must be expected to rail, quibble, or trifle, prevaricate, or denounce, according to his predominant propensity and power. So true is the poet's distich;

"Let Hercules himself do what he may,

"The cat will mew, the dog will have his day."

It is painful and mortifying to us thus to write; because it is a departure from our customary style and character, and perhaps from that self-respect to which we should adhere, even when inflicting chastisement on the guiltiest offender against literary decorum, and gentlemanly courtesy—to say nothing of his moral delinquency, in the violation of truth. Our apology is, that, being engaged, (we think *necessarily* and

hope *usefully*) in cleansing a foul spot in the literature of our country, we must employ such means as the case requires. The remedy must correspond to the disease. Soothing lenitives are totally unfit for obstinate maladies. And we are yet to be convinced that a vile and degraded theme can be suitably treated in delicate language and dignified thought. It must be handled with indignant severity, or passed by in silent scorn. A silken cord round the neck of a felon, would be out of place. A hempen one suits him better.

The petty and malicious misrepresentations, which the writer makes in almost every page, apparently from a disposition to gratify his splenetic temper, rather than to gain any decided advantage in argument, are eminently disgraceful to him. "To what purpose" he asks "are certain organs of sense double? since, according to Spurzheim, we see only with *one eye*, and hear with only *one ear*."

Spurzheim has no where said this, but *the reverse*. In his attempt to explain the phenomenon of the *singleness* of our perceptions, while our perceiving organs are *double*, Gall distinguishes two states of activity in our organs of sense. One of these states he calls *active* the other *passive*. Merely to *see* is the *passive* state of vision; to *look* the *active*. To *hear* is the *passive* state of the sense of hearing; to *listen* the *active* state. Gall farther says, that, when we simply *see*, we employ *both* eyes; but, when we *look*, we employ chiefly, if not solely, *one eye*, and that is our strongest; few, if any persons having equal strength in each eye. In like manner, when we simply *hear*, we use *both ears*; but only *one*, and that our strongest and best, when we *listen*. Such is the representation of Gall; and there is much truth in it. Spurzheim, however, does not concur with him, to the full extent of his theory, as appears from the following extract.

"Notwithstanding what has been said, Gall's explanation" (of the singleness of vision and hearing) "seems to me little satisfactory. Indeed it is very remarkable that passively, we perceive at the same time the impressions of *both organs of any sense*, not only if one, but also if different objects im-

press the two. Even different impressions of different objects may be perceived by *both organs of two senses at once*. We may, for instance, with *both eyes* see different objects at the same moment that with *both ears* we hear different sounds." (See Phrenology, or the Doctrine of Mental Phenomena. By G. Spurzheim, M. D. Vol. I. p. 265. Boston Edition—the very work which our author is pretending to review!) If a more unprincipled misrepresentation than this has ever been perpetrated, we know not where, or by whom.

Again. "How," asks the Rev. author, "are we to explain the fact, that men of a *lean habit* manifest the intellectual powers in as great perfection, as those of a *contrary habit*? since, according to Spurzheim, the *volume of the brain* increases with the size of the body."

Here is, *virtually*, another misrepresentation altogether unpardonable, because it is scarcely possible that it can be accidental. Perverse design, or the grossest ignorance, is palpable in it—ignorance, too, deeply faulty, because it might have been easily removed. Spurzheim has indeed said, and truly, that the bulk of the brain increases with that of the body, in the natural growth of the individual from childhood to manhood. But he has not said that the brain of the adult is enlarged, as the body swells with *adipose* matter. Yet such is palpably the writer's imputation—we should rather say his *slander*; for it is nothing less. An unmagnanimous, not to call it an ignominious and malignant spirit evidently led him to the commission of the act. His object was to inflict a dastardly wound on the reputation of a philosopher, of the highest standing, and the rarest assemblage of bright and estimable qualities, who no longer lives to be heard in his defence—of one whose talents and attainments were the stay and hope of his favourite science, and the admiration of millions; whose amiable disposition secured to him the affectionate regard of all who were intimate with him; whose mildness of temper and modesty of deportment were in beauteous accord with the spirit of christianity; whose writings, conversation, and example were so many lessons of spotless morali-

ty; and whose labours for the benefit of man, to which he fell a martyr, were truly apostolical.

Were it even true, that the brain of a man growing fat did increase in bulk, it would be either by the deposition in it of mere *adipose* substance, which Spurzheim says does not take place, or by a more juicy and full condition of the part, not by a new production of *cerebral* substance. Such is the only way, in which fattening augments size. And it has never been contended, that either blubber or any of the animal juices can act the part of brain, except perhaps of such brain, as certain anti-phrenologists possess. In the enlargement of the body from fattening, there is no increase in the amount of either real muscular, glandular, membranous, or osseous matter. The accumulation of juices and fatty matter alone constitutes the growth. Hence there is no accession of muscular or any other sort of bodily strength. Comparatively the reverse might be correctly asserted. We mean, when the accumulation of fat is in any measure excessive. That portion of it which is the result of sound and vigorous health, aids in giving tone to the system, and is so far useful.

As respects the augmentation of the brain, the same would be true. There would be no fresh production of cerebral substance. And we trust our author will not so far outrage truth, as to charge Phrenologists with asserting, that *fatty matter*, one of the least vital portions of the body, if vital at all, is essential to the operations of mind, or even auxiliary to them. Yet, from the frequency and grossness of his delinquencies in the same line, such a falsification would not surprise us. As far as Phrenology is concerned, his claim to veracity is extinct. What it may be in relation to other subjects, we neither know, nor shall curiously inquire.

In sundry parts of his Article, our author so staggers under the weight of his burden, contradicts himself so palpably, entangles himself in so many absurdities, and violates common sense to such an extent, as not only to render his paper contemptible, but himself an object of pity. This is at once

the more to be *lamented* and *reprehended*, on account of the responsibility imposed on him, by the vocation he follows. A paragraph of the sort referred to is found in the *Christian Examiner*, p. 258. There, mingling the expression with many other incongruous and unintelligible things, the writer speaks of the "antagonism of mind and body," as if those two portions of man were linked together by an all-wise and peace-loving Creator, to be engaged in perpetual jar and squabble, opposition and strife, and thus the ends of both be frustrated, their welfare subverted, and their usefulness foiled. There is no "antagonism" between them, but entire aptitude, and harmonious co-operation—we mean, when the system is well organized and healthy. In such a case, the mind is precisely the spring of action which the body needs, and the body the best form of apparatus, for the mind to put in motion, to effect the sublunary purposes for which both were created, and united as auxiliaries indispensable to each other. This is common sense; and the sentiment is but a due and reverential acknowledgment by us of the wisdom, power, and beneficence of the BEING who formed us. Our author's dogma is in the spirit of *blasphemy*. Its tendency is to detract from the perfections of God.

The gentleman contends again that "the bodily and mental powers can be exercised *exclusively*," that is *independently of each other*, and yet admits, that they cannot be thus exercised, "for any length of time, without *sustaining mutual injury*," that is, *without injuring one another—though mutually independent!* And he further avers, that, notwithstanding this reciprocal independence of body and mind, yet, by severe mental toil, "the whole vitality of the *system*" (that is, of the *body*) "is *absorbed in mind*," and thus "the action of the vital functions, circulation, *secretion*, &c., is impeded"! "The vitality of the system absorbed in mind"! Yet mind and body "independent of each other"! Was ever such a senseless jumble of mental haberdashery before exhibited! or can any trash be conceived of more disgraceful to literature, or more sickening to thought! As respects such an extraordinary

piece of doltishness, truly might we say with Hamlet, substituting certain knowing faculties for the external senses,

“Eyes without feeling, feeling without sight,
 “Ears without hands or eyes, smelling sans all,
 “Or but a sickly part of one true sense
 “Could not so mope”!

From what physiological “reformer” has the Rev. author learnt, that “secretion” is a vital function”? Orthodox physiologists do not call it so. But no matter. This is only a drop in the profound of his ignorance. At one time he admits “that there is a *certain connexion* between a *sound organization*” (meaning of course of the *brain*) “and a sound mind,” (including inevitably the *whole* mind, for he cannot divide it,) and, at another, asserts “that there are many of the *spiritual powers*” (of the mind) “*which have no connexion whatever with the brain.*” In the clauses just quoted, he clearly admits the *mutual dependence* of the mind and the body, and denies it in the next line; and pronounces the mind in some *parts or respects*, (no matter which,) “*purely spiritual,*” and in others *not*—thus making that simple and immutable agent as incongruous and self-contradictory as his own notions. Such are the fatuous inconsistencies, into which his feebleness, or his passions and prejudices have precipitated him!

Where he acknowledges the existence of a “*connexion between a sound organization and a sound mind,*” he represents it as “*analogous to the connexion which exists between the perfection of the Divine Mind, and the perfection of the universe.*” This comparison, intended, no doubt, as a wondrous parade of contemplative wisdom, is so singularly inapt and defective, as to afford strong ground to question the accuracy of the gentleman’s perception of the relation of analogy. The “*connexion between the perfection of the Divine Mind*” and “*the perfection of the universe*” is that of *cause and effect*. Because the “*Divine Mind*” is perfect, it produced a perfect universe. Nor could it have done otherwise, without *forfeiting* its claim to perfection. Does the writer mean, then, that a sound human mind makes a sound

human brain? or does he mean the reverse? that a sound brain makes a sound mind? If the former be his meaning, (as it ought to be, else his analogy fails) no man of sense will concur with him; if the latter, he is much worse than Phrenologists. They only contend that a well organized and healthy brain is essential to the *sound and efficient exercise* of the mind; while he pronounces it essential to *its existence*.

It would be scarcely either unjust or extravagant to say, that the writer's descant on *idiocy* partakes of its *theme*. Here it is, "alone in its glory."

"In like manner a native idiot has *doubtless* processes of thought going on *within* him. There is evidently a spirit at work in that crazy fabric. It is not in the *essential properties of mind* that he is wanting, but, owing to a very *imperfect organization of a very important part*; he is unfitted to the world in which he lives. So far as *that* is concerned, he is foolish and inefficient. In many cases, *if not in all*, idiocy consists in a disease of the nerves; and, where this is the case, it can prove nothing with respect to the peculiar dependency of the mind on the cerebral parts; for we know that *every disease tends to weaken the mental functions*, whether its seat be in the chest, or the abdomen, or the brain."—And yet the mind is independent of the body, of which the "nerves," our author's newly discovered seat of "idiocy," make a part!

To call this extract weak and trashy, and to assert that it possesses no *definite meaning*, would be mild condemnation. The intelligent reader can hardly fail to perceive in it one of the most striking specimens of inconsistency and *self-committal*, that imagination can conceive. By his pitiable staggering under the weight of his subject, and the feeble and purblind view he takes of it, the author has shown more clearly perhaps in *it*, that he has overtaken himself, than in any other part of his Article. Thoughtlessly dashing into a matter, of which he is disgracefully ignorant, he has as fatally entangled himself in a toil of his own weaving, as ever a Roman gladiator was entangled in the net of his adversary. In acknowledging that the idiot is not "*wanting in the essential properties*

of mind," but, that, "owing to a very *imperfect organization of a very important part*, he is unfitted to the world in which he lives"—in making this acknowledgement, he surrenders the whole question. He confesses the dependence of mind, for its power to manifest itself, on matter; and that is precisely what Phrenology contends for; and precisely what he had previously denied. True; the idiot *has* "a spirit in his crazy fabric;" but not "at work;" because it wants the instruments to work with. Yet the idiot has nerves, muscles, glands, bones, and thoracic and abdominal viscera, no less perfect than those who are not idiots. He is wanting only in brain, especially in the *reflecting* and *moral* organs of it. And it is in the *corresponding faculties* of the mind that he is deficient; those, we mean, of *morality* and *reflection*. These, moreover, are the very faculties, which our author pronounces "*purely spiritual*," and therefore *independent of matter*. Did the idiot possess them, he would not *be* an idiot. And the reason, we repeat, why he does not possess them is, that he is destitute of the organs, by which they are manifested; or he has them in a condition unfit for action. Let him be furnished with those organs in sufficient size and vigour, and his "*purely spiritual and independent*" faculties will be wanting in him no longer. From being a *mere animal*, he will rise immediately to the condition of a *man*. In his *nerves*, we repeat, (notwithstanding what our author alleges to the contrary) no defect or derangement has been observed. He sees, hears, tastes, smells, feels, and exercises his muscles like sound-minded men. But he is defective in those high mental faculties, which ennoble our nature.

Many idiots possess most of the *perceptive* organs of the brain in considerable development, and are similarly endowed with the *perceptive* faculties. Indeed the precise correspondence that always exists between the cerebral developments and the mental manifestations of those beings constitutes one of the strong-holds of Phrenology, which its enemies have never been able to shake; and which those of them who have any *judgment* or *discretion* never venture now to

assail. Nor would our author have done so, had he possessed either.

The gentleman's location of idiocy in the "nerves," in defiance of the knowledge of the medical world, no less than of common sense, betrays in him a degree of assurance and hardihood, not to give it a harsher name, which nothing but his want of information can account for; and for which not even that affords a sufficient excuse. Nor, wanting as he is in correct information, can we bring ourselves to the belief, that he is serious in his statement of the cause of idiocy. He surely knows better, and makes the statement only in jest, or from inbred perversity, and a dogged resolution to do all in his power to discredit Phrenology, whether by right or wrong, truth or untruth. For the bitterness of his opposition, and his unmeasured hostility to the science, it is scarcely possible that he has not some sinister reason. Whatever earnestness the love of truth and a desire to do good may awaken, they never give rise to rage or malice. The honest and manly inquirer, however eager and persevering he may be in his researches, does not necessarily love his opponents less than others, though he may love science more. Has the gentleman's head ever been tested by the callipers or the craniometer, and found wanting? and has that event, small in itself, though "great" perhaps to a "little man," had an influence on his opinion? We ask the questions; let others answer them. We have known men hostile to Phrenology on the ground referred to.

There is one reason in particular, why we are led to suspect, that our author's objections and cavils arise at times fully as much from perversity of temper, as from ignorance. He seems willing that the mind should be connected with any part of the body, but the brain. He admits that defective *nerves* may make a *fool*, but not a *cerebral* defect. Why? Is it because Phrenologists and all other men of sense know and assert the contrary? and does he aim at distinction through crookedness and contrariety? Zoilus achieved notoriety by lampooning Homer, Thersites by defaming his il-

lustrious compatriots, and Eratostratus by setting fire to the Temple of Diana. And our Rev. author has "damned" himself, by his Article, to more noise and notice, than he could probably have done by *volumes of sermons*—such as he can write. If merely to be *talked and written about*, therefore, be his object, he has been discreet in his measures; for, that he can obtain celebrity *by fair means*, we think impossible.

His assertion that "every disease tends to weaken the mental functions, whether its seat be in the chest, or the abdomen, or the brain," is another mistake, as gross as can be imagined. No disease "weakens the mental functions," until its influence has *reached the brain*, and *deranged some portion* of that viscus. This is a physiological truism, familiar to every tyro in medicine. Provided the brain be *sound and strong*, no matter what other portion of the body is diseased, and no matter how severe the disease may be, the *intellect is untouched*. And, on the contrary, if the brain be deranged, and every other organ sound, the mental functions suffer, as certainly as vision is impaired by a morbid state of the eye, or hearing by one of the ear. In thus *virtually* asserting, then, that the connection of the mind with "the chest and the abdomen" is as immediate as with the "brain," the gentleman has but given us another proof of his disregard for truth, or his utter ignorance of his subject—He may take his choice—But all these facts have been already so long and so fully established, that we perhaps owe the reader an apology for having even referred to them—much more for dwelling on them.

We shall state a single fact respecting idiocy, which, though familiar to many others, may be new to our author, and, should this page meet his eye, may so far diminish his want of knowledge. It often occurs, that a person, *idiotic* when in health, becomes *intellectual* when ill of a *cephalic* fever. The augmented excitement of the brain, in this case, which would render a sound-minded man *delirious*, renders an idiot sane. The reason is obvious. The heightened tone and tensivity of the brain make amends for the want of its development and size. The intellectual and moral organs of an idiot being

small, and their tone low, their action is necessarily feeble and inefficient. But, when attacked by inflammation, or excited to a condition bordering on it, their tone rises, and their action becomes comparatively vigorous. Hence they are better instruments for the mind to work with; and intellect and morals are much improved. The inflammation disappears, and the manifestation of mind accompanies it. The being is again an idiot. Such occurrences are not unfrequent. How will the Rev. gentleman account for them, on his notion of the *abstract spirituality* of some of the mental functions, and their entire independence of matter? Why do those functions appear and disappear, with the changes in the condition of matter? And the writer's "purely spiritual" functions (we mean the *moral* and *reflective*) are the very ones that do thus oscillate between torpor and action. Do they put off their spirituality, and surrender their independence, when the brain wants tone, and resume them, as soon as its tone is augmented? Or what other absurdity will be resorted to, by the writer, as a cover in defeat? In truth, he can neither find nor form a cover, but must bear, in nakedness, and without means of defence or retreat, whatever may be inflicted on him, in return for his wanton temerity and injustice. On the principles he advocates, the entire problem is inexplicable. But on phrenological principles, the solution is easy. The idiot has a mind; but it cannot manifest itself, without a suitable apparatus. In a healthy condition (we mean its *usual* condition) his brain is too phlegmatic and feeble. But, when heightened in its tone by inflammation, it acquires sufficient activity and vigour to serve the mind in the production of intellectual and moral phenomena.

The writer shows himself to be no less ignorant of the history of Phrenology, than of its principles. His remarks, p. p. 261-2, so pert and indecorous in manner, about the "*affective*" faculties being seated in the "heart or the abdomen," have been made a hundred times before, and as often refuted by phrenological writers. It is evident, moreover, from what he has there said, that he knows nothing of the influence and

offices of the brain, in the animal economy. He is a stranger to the supremacy of that organ, as relates to the functions of the other parts of the body—or else he plays the empty jester. He tells us that “anger makes the knees shake,” an emotion of bashfulness “suffuses the cheeks, but rises no higher than the temples,” “desire causes sighing, but stops short with the intercostal muscles,” “fear arrests the motion of the heart,” “mirth moves the diaphragm and the risorius muscle,” and “grief acts on the abdomen and the lachrymal glands”—all this he flippantly recites, and then, in awkward derision, or in his own style of disjointed logic, (the premises and conclusion never agreeing,) infers that the several emotions here enumerated, have their actual seats in the organs they thus act on—*anger in the knees, bashfulness in the cheeks, desire in the intercostal muscles, and grief in the belly!* Why did he not add, to make his foolery complete, that *rage* is seated in the *fist*, because it clinches the fingers, and *love* in the *arms*, because they open to receive, and close to infold the beloved object! He has again asserted, that the “connexion of the soul with the body is not *local* but *virtual*” (*what does that mean?*) and that this “virtual connexion” is not with the “brain only, but with every part of the system!”

If the gentleman’s reputation can survive his paternity to such senseless and mystified jargon as this, it is immortal! At least, it is proof against the worst that folly and ignorance can do to destroy it.—Or, is his philosophy *true*, as relates to *himself*? Does his “consciousness” tell him, that there is no *real*, but only a “virtual” connexion between his soul and body? and that this is equally close and strong with *every portion* of his body? If so, the secret of his mental inefficiency is perhaps revealed. “Divide and conquer”—“Disperse and destroy,” were the war-maxims of Philip. Our author’s mind, therefore, being frittered and scattered through every part of his system, except his “*lump of medulla*,” where it ought to be, but seems to be wanting, no wonder that the manifestations of it, in so diluted and disjointed a condition, are puny and ineffectual. It would be marvellous, were they otherwise.

Gravely, and for the instruction of the Rev. author, should he once more condescend to receive the instruction he so grievously needs. But it has this moment occurred to us, that, "*for fear of being tempted into controversy, he makes it a point to read no replies*" to his celebrated Article. In this he is discreet, if he wishes to avoid further disgrace. For his own sake he should either keep out of controversy, or learn to acquit himself more creditably when in it. He has already engaged in it *once too often*. But no matter; that is *his* concern, not *ours*. Nor shall we allow ourselves to be seduced or driven from our duty by it. It is our province to offer the instruction, whether he consent to receive it or not. We therefore proceed in *our* business, and leave him to *his*.

We inform him, then, that all parts of the system, which possess sensibility, or exhibit muscular motion, derive from the *brain*, more or less directly, their functional powers. Even as respects himself, anomalous as his composition may be, were his brain detached from his "diaphragm," "cheeks," "belly," and "lachrymal glands," he would not be likely to blush, laugh, cry, or grieve with those parts any more. With regard to *blushing*, we fear that he is much of a stranger to it, except, what he may have learnt of it by vision from *exterior sources*. We doubt whether his own "experience" and "consciousness," which he so earnestly consults and devotedly idolizes, have ever revealed it to him. Had he the ordinary susceptibility to it, his ill-mannered mockery, exhibited in the following sentence, would rarely suffer his cheek to grow pale. "An emotion of anger causes the knees to shake, but leaves *Combativeness*, and every other *ativeness* in the phrenological *ennead* of propensities, unmoved." Nor are his repetition of the expression "Gall and I," aimed as a taunt at the memory of the modest and noble-minded Spurzheim, and his nickname of "*craniomaney* or *skull-guessing*," vulgarly bestowed by him on Phrenology, any better. Such petty and coarse affronts and indignities are brutish, and testify irresistibly to the debasement of the fountain from which they issue. Any paper superior to the lowest and

foulest pasquinade would be disgraced by them. It is amazing, therefore, that they are admitted into a work expressly devoted to taste and piety! and conducted and supported by scholars of standing!—and ministers of the Gospel!

One extract more from the Article, and adieu to such trumpery.

“The Phrenologist’s account of what he is pleased to call the mind, is unquestionably the most absurd theory, that was ever contrived to support a beloved hypothesis. His classification of the mental powers is an insult to consciousness. The whole system is framed with exclusive reference to this world; for even “Veneration” does not necessarily imply a Supreme Being as its object. It has no point of contact with the world of spirits, and renders many spiritual phenomena—regeneration for example—altogether inexplicable. That Reason, Faith, Consciousness, and the power of moral self-determination should be left out of view in this system, as not coming within the experience of Phrenologists, is not surprising. But how are we to account for the omission of so obvious and common a faculty as Memory? Is the whole ground preoccupied? Is there no room in cerebrum or cerebellum? Cannot the advocates of this doctrine, by a little arrangement, by crowding or retrenching, by omitting *Veneration*, say, or *Conscientiousness*, find space for one more organ? If they can, we advise them to do so, with all speed, and to call that organ Memory; for, if there is any thing certain about the human mind, it is the existence of such a faculty. Its operation is not to be explained by the combined functions of other powers. If any attribute of the mind is single and distinct, this is so.”

Does the English, or any other language, contain a parallel to this extract! If so, we know not where. To us the production is unique. Were we to attempt to characterize it as briefly and definitely as possible, we should employ, as descriptive of it, the four terms, *trash* and *arrogance*, *folly* and *falsehood*. Its literary defects, though sufficiently unscholar-like, must pass unnoticed. But some of its other faults shall be briefly adverted to.

It is not true, that Phrenology has "reference *exclusively* to matters of *this* world"; though its advocates do not vain-gloriously pretend to scan the affairs of *another*. "Veneration," pointing to more than sublunary things, *does* come into "contact with a world of spirits;" at least it recognises such a "world," and implies a "Supreme Being" as its supreme "object." And it does so "necessarily," because it *must* point and act in conformity to its entire nature. True; it points also to earthly objects, as not unworthy of its regard. So do *love* and *gratitude*, which notwithstanding point also to a Supreme Being. Veneration embraces every thing deemed venerable from its standing, and is in its highest and most glorious exercise, when doing homage to the Creator. Hence it has been denominated *a sense of Deity*. Hope reaches also beyond the grave, and furnishes the strongest argument that *reason* can offer, in support of a belief in the immortality of man. *Revelation* alone surpasses it, and alone confirms the doctrine. Ideality ranges through Heaven, to cull and mingle its splendours and sublimities, as described in the Scriptures, and depicted by fancy, with those of earth. Nor does it stop there. It deepens its horrors, as the works of Homer, Virgil, Dante, Milton, and others attest, by imagery derived from the REGIONS OF WO. And Wonder is at home among INVISIBLES and IMMORTALS. So shallow are the calumnies of our author on this point!

Respecting "*Reason, Faith, and Consciousness*," his insinuation is insolent, because it is intended as a taunt on Phrenologists, and his observations reprehensible, because they are untrue. Those three terms with the mental conditions they indicate, find a place in Phrenology, as fitly as in metaphysics. They are not, however, fallaciously made the representatives of three *faculties* of the mind; but of three *operations* or *modes of action* of faculties. Reason consists in the exercise of the *reflective faculties* on matter furnished by the *perceptive* ones. Faith springs chiefly from the action of Hope, Veneration, and Wonder, aided by Comparison and Causality; and Consciousness, being but a *feeling of self*, be-

longs alike to the active condition of all the faculties. Whether we love or hate, hope or fear, venerate or wonder, reason, perceive, or perform any other mental function, we are conscious of our being, and of the act or exercise we are engaged in. But, as heretofore observed, we have no consciousness of the instrumentality by which we act—whether it is by mind alone, matter alone, or the union of both. Any knowledge we have on that point reaches us through another channel.

The writer further charges and complains, that Phrenology renders “regeneration” inexplicable. Is he sure that he can explain that change by any scheme of mental philosophy that has yet been devised, or by any that even he, in his pride of affected wisdom, can imagine? We need hardly say, that the *mode* of the change, we mean the *kind of action*, by which it is produced, has never been explained. Nor does any person, except one who overrates his abilities, pretend to explain it. This much we know of it; *the expression is metaphorical*. It does not mean an absolute change of *nature and kind*. The regenerated are still *human beings*; their faculties the same in number and general character as before. No new faculty is *added*, nor any original one *taken away*. Nor could either be done, without destroying the fitness of the individuals for an abode on earth. For such an abode man is perfectly fitted by nature; and he must retain that fitness, abandon his abode, or be useless and uncomfortable in it. What, then, does “regeneration” mean? A thorough moral reform, carried to the highest pitch, of which the individual is susceptible—a final conquest achieved by the more pure and elevated faculties over the subordinate and grosser ones—In other words, it is a transition from animal and vicious to moral and virtuous feelings, resolutions, and indulgencies; and, to human conception, *there* the matter ends. The limited powers of man can trace the change no further. Beyond this lies the land of mystery, which, in our present state of being, is forbidden to our footsteps and even to our vision. There is no Pisgah, from which to descry it. Nor

can we attempt to enter it, without violating moral, as well as transcending intellectual law, *because* it is forbidden. To this the Rev. author of the Article is no exception, however *spiritual* and *regenerate* he may fancy himself. We do think, then, that Phrenology, though “born of the dissecting knife” and buried in the pollutions of the “flesh,” as he pronounces it, is competent to render “explicable” all the “regeneration” he has undergone, either in morals or intellect—if indeed the tree is to be judged of by its fruit. For, in whatever light it be regarded, the fruit he has put forth, in penning his Article, bespeaks much more forcibly a *degenerate* than a *regenerate* parentage—savours much more of *animality* and the *flesh*, than of *humanity* and the *spirit*. In Scriptural language “Regeneration” is the *conquest* of the *flesh* by the *spirit*; in phrenological language it is the *ascendency* of the *moral* over the *animal* organs; two forms of expression substantially the same.

To come still closer to the point. If “regeneration” consist in moral reform and improvement, (and if it does not, we should be gratified to be informed *intelligibly* what it is) where is the difficulty of effecting it, on phrenological, any more than on metaphysical principles? In the creed of the metaphysician, the habits and sentiments to be changed and ameliorated, are the product of a degenerate and vicious spirit; in that of the Phrenologist, they depend on some unfavourable condition of the material organ, with which the spirit works. In the former case, therefore, it is *simple spirit* that is to be *changed* and improved; in the latter, *compound matter*. We need not ask, which process *seems* the easiest, and which *is* the most intelligible? Of the change of spirit we can form no conception, the subject being altogether *transcendental*. With the change of compound matter we are familiar, because we witness it every moment. In the economy of the universe we witness nothing else, that economy consisting in change. But that which we can most readily understand necessarily appears to us most easy to be effected. To improve the tone and condition of compound matter,

therefore, seems much easier and more natural, than to *revolutionize the essence* of simple spirit. We say "revolutionize"; and we employ the term in its strictest meaning. *Any change in that which is simple, is a revolution, and can be nothing less. It is a destruction of identity, and a conversion into something else essentially different.* This is common sense. A thing that is simple cannot be changed *in part*; because it *has no parts*. No partial alteration therefore is predicable of it. If changed at all, it must be changed entire, in substance, essence, and qualities; unless the same qualities can belong to different substances, which would involve a contradiction, the qualities being nothing more than the manifestations of the substance and its conditions. They are necessarily dependent on that whose qualities they are. They therefore accompany it in its changes. But the human spirit is simple; a position which no metaphysician will controvert. It is also asserted, in the metaphysical schools, to be the ground of personal identity, because it *never* changes, while the material portions of the system undergo *incessant* change. From these premises, whose soundness our author will hardly contest, but one inference can be drawn. Change the *spirit*, and it is at once *another being*, in substance no less than in qualities. Hence, according to metaphysical showing, personal identity is gone; and the *regenerated* is literally a *different man*, possessing no longer the same mental attributes, moral or intellectual. All his former loves and hatreds, friendships and antipathies, hopes and fears, talents and knowledge are as completely extinguished, as if his mind were annihilated. But the fact is altogether different. In those who are called the *regenerated*, no such change has occurred. All that constitutes personal identity remains untouched, the alteration produced being usually much more apparent in *pretence and profession*, than in *practice and example*. Former loves, hatreds, and friendships are not extinguished, nor is a revolution produced in talents or attainments. As far as practical manifestations are concerned, things remain very much as they were. The

regenerated pursues his calling, and mingles in the manifold affairs of earth, as if nothing had happened to him. His *newness*, consequent on "regeneration," must indeed be mostly *spiritual* and *internal*; for the *man in the flesh* shows but little of it. If his spirit be *exclusively* or even *chiefly heavenward* bound, it must be truly independent of his body, and his body equally independent of it; for they pursue different routes, and engage in different matters, not to say opposite ones. In fine; Phrenology being free from all these difficulties and contradictions, is much more favourable to the production and explanation of moral reform and improvement, than any other scheme of mental philosophy. It is not too much to say, that it *alone* favours and explains such changes, and that, without it, they could be neither produced nor understood. This has been repeatedly made appear, by phrenological writers, and could be easily shown again, did the occasion require it. It is not, we repeat, true, then, that Phrenology renders "regeneration inexplicable"; nor, in the *mystical* sense of the term, does it concern with it. And it thus avoids all interference with it, on the ground, that things *mysterious* and things *practically useful* are *essentially distinct* if not *opposite* in their natures. In fact, though our author's predilection for some of them is sufficiently striking, the less we have to do with mysteries of every description, the better. They are the source of some of the deepest errors and bitterest misfortunes that have fallen on our race. The uses commonly made of them are odious and execrable. They are employed, by the crafty, as means to decoy and ensnare the ignorant and unsuspecting. The few wield them to make willing dupes and retainers of the many; and thus is established the *tyrannical* control of Church and State over degraded man. Nor will *genuine* freedom ever be able to gain a footing on earth, and dispense her blessings in their full extent, until all privileged dealers in mystery, by whatever names they may be known, shall be unmasked, and stript of the power which has long enabled them to lord it over the

world, and retard, by their influence, and for their own benefit, the progress of truth.

On the subject of "Memory," the Rev. gentleman is equally at fault. His remarks, from beginning to end, are characterized by ignorance and misrepresentation. Nor is it easy to decide, which quality predominates. Had he any knowledge of the history of Phrenology, it would not be necessary to inform him, that the point he introduces here, in a manner so exceptionable, and with an air so triumphant, has been discussed and settled, we might say *demonstrated*, by the advocates of the science, times almost innumerable. Memory is not a *faculty* of the mind, as has been so often made plain. It is a *mode of action* of all the *intellectual faculties*, each performing the function according to its nature. Every intellectual or *idea-forming* faculty has a Memory for its own ideas, and can call them up at pleasure. And the stronger and more active the faculty is, the readier and more perfect is its memory. But no one faculty can remember the ideas of another. Hence the mind has many Memories, or powers to renew the various states, or forms of impression and action it has experienced. It has one Memory for *languages*, another for *forms*, a third for *colours*, a fourth for *places*, a fifth for *tunes*, a sixth for *numbers*, and thus throughout the entire class of intellectual faculties, each possessing a power to call up, at will, its own ideas. That these are *different Memories*, and not different *modes* of the *same* Memory, appears from the well known fact, that the same individual possesses them in different degrees of strength, and that one or more of them may be entirely obliterated, while the others remain unimpaired. The ideas they embrace, moreover, as every one may convince himself by a strict self-examination, are different kinds of *mental products*. But as well may our author contend for the existence of a *single nerve* capable of performing all sorts of nervous functions, as for that of a single faculty or power competent to every form of memory. His dogmatical assertion, therefore, that "if any attribute of

the mind is single and distinct, this" (Memory) "is so," has no foundation in truth. His own "consciousness," of which he speaks so often, and on whose suggestions and revelations he so confidently relies, would rectify his mistake on this point, did he faithfully consult it. And his invocation to Phrenologists, to make room for an organ of "Memory" in "cerebrum or cerebellum," by "crowding, retrenching, or omitting" some of the present ones, is but another instance of his rudeness and ill-breeding. In whatever rank of society he may move, and in whatever institution he may have been educated, these reiterated violations of courtesy and decorum, are proof irresistible that his propensities are grovelling, and his caste of character low. They clearly show that the *animal compartment* of his brain preponderates, and that his character participates much more of the "flesh" than of the "spirit." He possesses in particular, in high development, Self-Esteem, Secretiveness, and Destructiveness. On the truth of this we freely peril our skill in Phrenology. In Conscientiousness and Benevolence he is wanting.

That he may act in concert with other writers, as ignorant of the matter as himself, the Rev. author refers to the Baron Cuvier, as an *opponent* of Phrenology, and triumphs in such authority, as furnishing an argument conclusive of his opinion. What then will he say, when this authority shall be turned against him? and it shall be shown that he adduced it from a want of knowledge? Will he still admit the authority of the Great Naturalist to be unquestionable? Let the experiment decide. True; Cuvier never thoroughly studied Phrenology, and was not therefore familiar with it in its details. But, that he was an advocate of its fundamental principles, appears from the following extract.

"L' anatomie comparé en offre une autre confirmation" (of the truth of Phrenology) "dans la proportion constante du volume de ces lobes" (the *front lobes* of the brain) "avec le degré d' intelligence des animaux." (See Report on the experiments of Flourens, by Cuvier, Portal, Bertholet, Pinel, and Dumeril, five of the most distinguished naturalists and

physiologists of the age.) This is in perfect accordance with Phrenology, which locates the intellectual organs in the front lobes of the brain—or rather affirms these lobes to be composed of those organs.

That the early prejudices of Cuvier were unfriendly to Phrenology, is true; but it is no less so, that his observation and reflection conquered them, so far as he studied the subject; and he may be correctly said to have died a Phrenologist. His public proselytism, therefore, in contradiction of sentiments previously avowed by him, in a manner equally public, is the strongest testimony he could have offered of his full conviction of the truth of the science. But suppose the Baron, who never thoroughly studied Phrenology, and whose mind was so engrossed by other pursuits, that he had but a partial knowledge of it, had lived and died an anti-phrenologist; what follows? Must it be necessarily inferred that the science is untrue? It would be exceedingly hazardous for the writer to say so. If the authority of a great man be proof positive of the unsoundness of a doctrine, which he either has or has not studied, how stands the truth of the Christian religion, with the testimony of Hume, Voltaire, d'Alembert, and hundreds of others of great talents and extensive knowledge in direct opposition to it? The citation of human authority alone in support of a doctrine, disparages either *it*, or its *defender*, or both. It shows the *former* to be doubtful, or the *latter* weak—or, as is too often the case, that each charge is just. Nor would it be easy to convince us that this is not the fact in the instance before us. In matters of science, nothing but the authority of nature is to be relied on.

Shortly before the death of Dr. Gall, and during his last illness, Cuvier sent to him the cranium of an individual, of a well-marked character, and requested him to place it in his collection; adding, that he thought it confirmatory of his doctrines. The reply of the dying philosopher was memorable, and was probably intended as a rebuke, for the injustice he had previously sustained from Cuvier. "Tell the Baron," said he, "that my collection wants but one cra-

nium more—*my own*—and that will soon be ready for it.” Cuvier, we believe, was one of the speakers, who pronounced eulogies on Gall at his grave.

Might the authority of men avail, in matters of science, we could adduce it with conclusive effect, in behalf of Phrenology. The Phrenological Society of Paris contains many of the ablest *savans* of the kingdom. The testimony of such a body of men, therefore, illustrious alike in literature and philosophy, is infinitely weightier than any thing that can be opposed to it. The reason is plain. The Parisian Phrenologists have studied the science, understand it, and can, therefore, judge of it. But, of the opponents of Phrenology, the reverse, or *something worse*, is true. They are either ignorant of Phrenology, or, understanding it, deliberately *falsify* in relation to it—for they never represent it truly. At any rate, the character of the Phrenologists of Paris is a blighting commentary on the following insolent remark in the Article. “We are not at all apprehensive that this system” (Phrenology) “will ever find much favour with philosophers and scientific men.”—Thus does the whiffet snarl at the lion! and the chattering magpie flout the eagle! Unless the author be much more ignorant on the subject than we think him, he *knows* that the purport of the sentence just quoted is *untrue*.

It was our intention to close our paper here, and trouble neither ourselves nor others with any further notice of the Article in the Examiner. But, resolved to bestow, now, on that production, all the attention we ever shall do, we respectfully ask the reader to accompany us a little farther, and listen to our author’s descant on the *genius of worms and insects*;

“In tenui labor; at tenuis non gloria, *si quem*

“*Numina læva sinunt, auditque vocatus Apollo.*”

Whether Apollo, or any other invoked and propitiated god or goddess has *inspired* the Rev. suppliant, let the following rubbish of the mind testify.

“But, *above all*, if it be true, as Phrenologists assert, that this dependence of mind on brain holds through all the or-

ders of animated nature, why is not the brain of the lower tribes always proportioned to the amount of mind manifested by them? It requires but a cursory observation to perceive that this is far from being the case. Not to insist on the example of vertebrated animals, in several of whom the proportion of the brain to the rest of the body is larger than in man; what are we to say of the astounding manifestation of mind displayed by the insect world; exemplified, not only in the wonderful contrivances of the bee, the spider, and the common ant, but in the actions more wonderful still, as having no immediate references to the necessities of life, and as bearing the nearest brute resemblance to the peculiar manifestations of human beings. Such are the wars of conquest carried on by different nations of the termites, in which the vanquished become the captives and slaves of the victors, and are subjected by them to all kinds of servile labour. Now in these animals, the brain (if there be any) is not only small, absolutely and relatively; but its very existence is exceedingly problematical. Many physiologists, with Linnæus at their head, have denied it."

Before proceeding to a particular examination of this flourish, which rests entirely on a false foundation, we shall make a few remarks on the latter clause of it. That Linnæus has denied a brain to insects generally is true. But it is equally true, that his denial has not verified itself, by taking brain from them. And, in the very sentence, which contains the denial, he has himself virtually *contradicted* and nullified it. The following are his words.

"INSECTS—Spiracles, lateral pores; jaws, lateral; organs of sense, tongue, eyes, antennæ on the head; brain *none*; ears *none*; nostrils *none*." See "GENERAL SYSTEM OF NATURE."

This sentence, we say virtually contradicts and invalidates itself, by granting to insects the external senses, and denying them the organ which constitutes the *actual seat* or *centre* of those senses. For that their seat is in the *brain* and not in the *nerves*, or the external organs, is susceptible of proof. In

the function of sensation, whatever be its kind, the nerves are but instruments *subservient* to the brain, the latter being the ruling organ, in which the sensitive power immediately resides, and in which the functional action is consummated. It is at once the centre of sensation, and the source of the will. In saying that insects have no brain, Linnæus could not have meant that they have *nothing tantamount to one*. He must have known that they possess a central mass of cerebral matter performing the office of a brain, to which, as just mentioned, the nerves of sense are but ministering appendages. Or if he was unapprized of this, his stock of anatomical and physiological knowledge was more limited than we have thought it, though we have always been aware that it was not great, his attention having been engrossed by other pursuits. He also denies to insects "ears" and "nostrils." By this, however, he could not have meant that they can neither *hear* nor *smell*; for many of them are exceedingly acute in both functions. And functions universally indicate *appropriate organs*, and never exist without them. His meaning, therefore, must have been, that they are destitute of organs *technically* called ears and nostrils *from their forms and situations*. Respecting the brain, the same, we think, must have been true. He could have intended no more, in the expression used, than that insects have nothing, which, from its *figure* and *location*, can be called, in *technical language*, a brain. A brain of some sort is just as indispensable to a nerve of sense, to render it efficient, as the nerve itself is to the *organ* of sense. A brain we mean is as necessary to give efficiency to the *optic* and the *auditory* nerves, as *they* are to give efficiency to the eye and the ear. And a tongue and a nose can taste and smell as well, without gustatory and olfactory nerves, as they can without a mass of cerebral matter constituting a brain, or forming a substitute for it. An animal of any description possessing five external senses, and no brain, would be as great an anomaly, as a human being alive, and performing all the functions of life, without a head. External senses indicate

a brain as certainly as a stream of water indicates a fountain, or a beam of light a luminous body. All this, we think, Linnæus must have known. Be that, however, as it may, we shall show presently, under the sanction of anatomical and physiological authority much weightier than his, that insects *do* possess a brain. But to return from this digression, if such it be.

The foregoing high-wrought flourish of our author, we say, rests on the allegation, that Phrenologists contend, that the "amount of mind manifested" by man and other animals, is always proportioned to the quantity of brain possessed by them. Than this representation, nothing can be more untrue; nor can any thing more fully expose the want of knowledge, or the want of candour, or both, in its authors and propagators. Phrenologists have never, as their writings evince, contended for the notion here ascribed to them; but the *reverse*. They expressly deny that the abstract bulk of brain is necessarily the measure of the amount of mind displayed by its possessor. Better still; they prove it not to be so; for they do not, like our author and his anti-phrenological associates allow their positions to rest on mere arbitrary assertion. They back their assertions by facts and arguments not to be overthrown. Their doctrine in the present case, is, *that all other things being equal, the larger the brain, the stronger are the manifestations*, in which it is concerned. And this is as true and as plain, as that *the whole is greater than a part*. In fact, it is substantially the same axiom expressed in different words, and in reference to a different subject. No physiologist can deny it but at the hazard of his reputation, or rather with the *loss* of it, so far as a *palpable error* may affect it, and that error of such a nature, as nothing but *ignorance of his calling* could make him commit; nor can *any one* deny it, but in defiance of common sense. This simple contradiction is the only reply, to which the writer's objection is entitled. Respect, however, to the subject and the reader induces us to subjoin a few further remarks, bearing somewhat of an analytical character.

The writer alleges truly *for once*, that in several sorts of "vertebrated animals, the proportion of the brain to the rest of the body is larger than in man." But what of that? Have not Phrenologists said the same? Have they not even taken the lead in overthrowing the opposite doctrine inculcated on this point by other physiologists? Certainly they have. Have they, on the contrary, ever contended, that the superiority of man's intellect arises from the superior proportional size of his brain to that of the rest of his body? Never. They were also the chief subverters of error on that topic. All they have contended for on the subject is, that, other things being alike, the larger the *intellectual organs* are, whether in man or in the inferior animals, the stronger is the intellect. And, as far as suitable investigations have been carried, that position is susceptible of proof, and has already received it. No matter how large the *animal* organs of the brain are. *They* confer no intellect; because they are designed for a different purpose. They are the seat of animal appetency, and furnish therefore no *knowledge* themselves, but the mere impulse to some sorts of action, subservient as well to the acquisition of knowledge, as to its application. They are, in fact, but the breeze that urges the vessel onward, the compass, chart, and rudder being furnished by the intellectual and moral organs. The difference between the human brain and that of the inferior animals consists in the presence or absence, and the difference in size, of the several classes of organs, and perhaps also in their temperament and tone. In the former, the *intellectual*, more especially the *reflective* organs, and the *moral* ones, are comparatively large; whereas, in the latter, they are small, or entirely wanting. Hence man is a moral being, while the animals beneath him are not; and hence also his superiority in other high modes of mental manifestation. Let the moral and reflecting organs be removed from the brain of man, and what remains will be an *animal* brain, and he will be nothing but an *animal in action*. His morality and reflection will be extinct. Were the whole brain of an ox made as large as all the rest of his

body, its intellectual organs retaining their present size, he would derive from the augmentation no increase of intellectual power. Of man the same may be affirmed. Were his brain tenfold its present size, in its animal compartment, the intellectual and moral continuing as they are, the change would only convert him into a greater and grosser animal. His intellectual and moral faculties, receiving no increase of power, would be swallowed up, or held at least in deeper subjection, by his inordinately augmented animal ones. These are facts which should be remembered and acted on, by those who aim at *practical craniology*. The mistakes made on that score, by *ignorant pretenders*, are among the most productive sources of mischief to the science. On this topic we shall offer two remarks. We have *never* seen a skilful craniologist officiously forward in displaying his skill, and *very rarely* an individual with a head *worthy of examination*, importunate to *have* it examined. In a special manner, we have never known an *advertising* craniologist, who was not a *charlatan*. Our country is threatened with a brood of phrenological Peripatetics, that promise to rank with Steam Doctors in medicine, and Pedlers in traffic.

The vertebrated animals, then, to which our author refers, as possessing large brains, derive from that cause no increase of intellectual vigour. The reason is plain. The animal compartment only of their brain is large, the intellectual compartment being diminutive, or partially wanting. These are some of the truisms of Phrenology, familiar to every one, who has any correct acquaintance with it. If they are new to the writer, his *ignorance* is the cause. And in him such ignorance is culpable. He has made it a ground of misleading others. Yet he might have easily removed it, by consulting the works of phrenological writers. And he should have done so, before becoming himself a *writer* on the science.

Nor will his appeal to insects and reptiles avail him, in his difficulties. Far from it. It has only confounded and entangled him the more, and rendered his condition the more hopeless. What does *he* know about the anatomy or the

functions of bees, spiders, common ants, and termites? Just as much as he knows about the size and colour of his own mind—and *no more*. His ignorance *here* is, if possible, more striking, than in relation to most other points; and its culpability is aggravated, by the perfect case, with which it might be removed. To say nothing of the mistakes he is constantly committing, his narrow-mindedness and illiberal feelings are proof conclusive that he is *no naturalist*. A correct knowledge of nature never fails to liberalize the mind, and improve in it the love of truth. But that such is not the condition of our author's mind, has been already shown. Does he *know* that there is not, in the insects he has mentioned, a perfect correspondence between cerebral development and mental manifestations? No, he does not; nor, rash and reckless as he is in his deviations from truth, will he deny our assertion. *He knows nothing of the matter*. And, unfortunately for him, some of the writers, to whom he refers, and on whose statements he confidently relies, were not much better informed on the subject than himself. This is especially true of Linnæus, to whom he looks, as his Magnus Apollo, neglecting the works of later and better informed writers easily accessible to him. That illustrious man was far from being distinguished as an anatomist or physiologist. Nor did he pretend to such distinction. His knowledge and fame were derived from a different quarter. It is well known that his attainments in those branches of science were but limited, even in his own day. They were greatly inferior to those of some of his contemporaries; though, at that period, neither *comparative* nor *minute* anatomy had much more than a name. Nobody at least was eminent in them; nor did any one, we believe, claim such eminence. It would hardly be extravagant to say, that both of those branches, as well as sound physiology, are the growth of the present century. Linnæus, at any rate, had but a superficial acquaintance with them, and was great chiefly, if not only, as a classical botanist and zoologist, and from his knowledge of the instincts and habits of animals and plants. He was fa-

miliar with the exterior of organized matter, but left the scrutiny of its interior to others. Capacious as his mind was, and untiring his industry, he neither was nor could be great in every department of natural science. His denial of brain to insects, therefore, has no weight with the naturalists of the present day, who are much better informed on the subject than he was, and know, from inspection, that the notion is groundless. Fortunately for the overthrow of error, and the accuracy and soundness of knowledge, the votaries of science are now in the habit, much more than formerly, of recurring to first principles, and consulting the book of nature, as authority, in preference to written books. And were our author to follow their example, the practice might make him less of a bigot, and more of a man of correct information, and a lover of truth. *A philosopher he can never be.* His reference to Linnæus, on the point we are considering, in the capacity of a "*physiologist*," is but another proof of his ignorance. A knowledge of the existence or non-existence of cerebral matter in animals, belongs to *anatomy*, not to *physiology*. As well might the gentleman refer to an itinerant sermon-maker, as authority on some intricate point in *Hebrew literature*, on account of his being able to recite by memory long passages from his *English Bible*. In truth he has shown wherever he has touched them, such broad ignorance of both anatomy and physiology, that none of his notions respecting them are entitled to the least credit or consideration. In mercy to himself, and in justice to others, he should either study them, or never again refer to them. One of the most abundant sources of error and mischief is the prurient and unconquerable propensity of sciologists, and petti-foggers in knowledge to be constantly dabbling in what they do not understand. Too weak-minded to be made *sensible* of their weakness, and too pragmatistical to remain quiet, or confine themselves to their own affairs, they not only corrupt science and contribute to retard its progress, but often sow discord among friends, and disturb the general harmony of society. To such meddlers, "*Ne sutor!*" should be the standing precept

—repeated by every one, till rendered effectual. We trust our author will not neglect it in time to come, as he did when he engaged in the composition of his Article.

With the subject, on which he has undertaken to instruct others, the Rev. gentleman is too little acquainted, to comprehend the plain fact, that brain is brain, whatever shape it may bear, by whatever name it may be known, or in whatever part of the body it may be situated, whether the head, the thorax, or the abdomen; and that therefore a ganglion, in inferior animals, may be to them precisely what a brain properly so-called is to those of a higher order. Nor does he know, we presume, that, even in man, the brain is regarded, by many anatomists, as nothing but an aggregation of ganglions, each ganglion constituting a distinct organ, differing in its functions from every other. According to this view of the matter, the moral organs are moral ganglions, the intellectual organs intellectual ganglions, and the animal organs animal ganglions. The name produces no effect on the function of the organ, any more than its situation. To all these things he is probably a stranger, because he is a stranger to the very elements of Phrenology, and likewise, as already mentioned, to those of anatomy and physiology, as well in themselves as their bearings. Yet he pretends to discuss these branches, and rails at those who do not think of them as he does! in other words, who are not as ignorant of them as himself! So did Jack Cade rail at and conspire to destroy every one not as illiterate as he was. And so, at all times, do the vulgar hate and malign their superiors.

On another point vitally important in the present discussion, he is equally ignorant; namely, that, as relates to power, in *all forms of living* organized matter, superior *intensity* is an efficient substitute for a want of *extensity*. In language perhaps more easily understood, that an elevation of tone and temperament in an organ, makes amends for a want of size in it. Abundant evidence in favour of this could be adduced, were it necessary to dwell on it, and had we leisure to do so. It is as susceptible of proof, as any other tenet in physiology.

Let us apply it to the insect tribe, and see whether it will not do something toward the removal of our author's objection, and the explanation of the mental phenomena manifested by that order of beings.

The muscular power of insects, in proportion to their size, is astonishing. Nor is this more strikingly true of any of them, than of common ants and termites. One of the former is known to be able to move with ease and rapidity, under a burden of many times its own weight. Nor is this less the case, we believe, with regard to the labouring class of the latter. But, according to the most approved views now entertained on the subject, muscular strength disproportioned to size arises from one of two causes, or from both united—muscles very firmly knit and organized; or muscles rendered highly vivid and intense, by an inordinate supply of cerebral influence; or, better still, we say, from the union of both. That there exists brain, moreover, wherever voluntary muscular motion connected with design exists, no body of intelligence doubts. The position is received as a physiological axiom. That our author doubts it, or cavils at it, therefore, is but a farther mark of his ignorance or perversity, or both. He might as well deny the necessity of cerebral matter to the attribute of sensibility. It is well known that the insect tribe, see, hear, taste, smell, and feel, many of them very acutely. This is strikingly true of the bee, the ant, the termes, and also of the spider, which, in some respects, has the character of an insect. But, that in all animals, whose anatomy is understood, the senses are nervous and cerebral functions, is universally admitted. Apart, then, from the discoveries made by entomological anatomists, we are justified in inferring, *with entire positiveness*, that insects also are indebted for their senses and power of voluntary motion, to cerebral substance. As matter of opinion, to deny or controvert this is absurd; none but a perfect ignoramus in anatomy and physiology will do it; and, as matter of fact, Cuvier, as already intimated, whose authority our author will not call in question, puts it out of dispute. His words are as follows.

“Le systeme nerveux de la plus part des insectes, est generalement composé d’ un *cerveau* formé de deux *ganglions* opposes, reunis par leur bases, donnant huit paires des nerfs et deux nerfs solitaires, et de douze ganglions, tous inferieures.” See “Regne Animal,” Tome IV. p. p. 293–4. Nor is it from Cuvier alone that we derive this knowledge. To every thorough-bred entomologist of the day it is as familiar as household words. Kirby and Spence, whose works are in hundreds of libraries in our country, have diffused it very amply. Is it not amazing, then, that our author should so expose his ignorance, touching information which even courts his acceptance!—No; it is not amazing—it is but in character with the conduct of all such *pretenders* to science as he is.

To this scheme of cerebral anatomy, common to a large class of the insect tribe, neither the bee, the ant, nor the termes is an exception. The spider also has a ganglionic brain. In fact, vision without light, hearing without sound, or smelling without odorous matter, would not be a greater anomaly, than the existence and exercise of any sense, or of any form of voluntary muscular motion, without a brain—To return.

In ants and termites, we say, there exists surprising muscular strength, in proportion to size, in consequence of high muscular intensity; that intensity being derived in part from the *inordinate motive energy of the brain and nerves*. Why then may not the same be true of other cerebral functions? Why may not *they* also be inordinately powerful, on account of inordinate cerebral intensity? We might vary the question, and ask, is it not *altogether probable that they are so*? We usually find a congenialness pervading all parts of the same animal—intensity and energy in one organ and its functions associated with the same qualities in others. Whenever then we discover, in an animal, great power in proportion to size, in one form of cerebral matter, we are authorized, if not compelled, to infer the same in relation to others. Spiders are also exceedingly vigorous in proportion to their size, a fact

denoting in them high cerebral and muscular intensity. So are bees; else, slender as their wing-muscles are, they could not bear their cumbrous bodies and burdens through the air, to great distances, and rise with them to the tops of lofty trees, as they are known to do. It is a fair inference, then, that a similar intensity in the intellectual organs of those insects may bestow on them a corresponding degree of sagacity and art. By "intensity" here, we mean nearly the same that we would by the words *high temperament*, or *compactness*, which is not confined to a part of the body, but pervades the whole of it. This view of the subject is intended for *fair-minded* and *reasoning men*. From them it will receive a candid consideration. From our author we know it will not. Nor will his treatment of it be a matter of any concern to us.

With the anatomy, especially the minute anatomy of insects, our acquaintance, as yet, is very limited. As far, however, as investigations on the subject have been carried, it clearly appears, that, like all other kinds of living matter, the different species of that tribe of animated nature act in accordance with their form and organization. They have organs fitted specifically for the performance of their functions. Nor is this more strikingly true of any sort of insects, than of the termites. That family, in the first place, differs not a little from every other known one, in figure, habits, and general policy. But this is not all. The family consists of three classes, *breeders*, *labourers*, and *warriors*, each class differing widely from the other two. The warriors will not and cannot labour, the labourers cannot breed, nor can the breeders either fight or labour. Why? Because each class, as far as it has been examined, is organized *exclusively* for its own mode of life and action. The warriors have shields and armour, the labourers instruments to work with, and the breeders are supplied with generative organs. Of the peculiar cerebral aptitudes of these animals, but very little is known. As the cerebral developments, however, of all other animals that have been sufficiently examined, have been uniformly found to correspond with their structure, propensities,

and modes of life, it is reasonable to conclude, until the contrary shall have been made appear, that the same is true with regard to the termites. Indeed, under the present economy of things, it would hardly be extravagant to pronounce it *impossible* for the case to be otherwise. We every where find organization as perfectly adapted to function, as luminous bodies are to give light, or as any other causes are adapted to their effects.

We wish it to be understood, that we are now writing *extra scholam*, and therefore on our own responsibility. Phrenology, which deals only in *facts*, does not yet *expressly* sanction us in the views we have given; though we think *reason* does; and we doubt not that Phrenology *will* hereafter. For any mistakes we may have committed, then, the science is not answerable. They are our own; and we acknowledge and assume them, with all their consequences. Supposing them to exist, they are certainly less glaring, than those into which our author has plunged, on the same subject. By denying brain to termites, ants, bees, and spiders, and abstracting their *minds entirely* from their *matter*, he makes them *more spiritual* than man himself, some of whose mental faculties he acknowledges to be, in some degree, referable to his cerebral organization. To insects, therefore, he awards the *superiority*; mind or spirit being superior to matter. His views on this subject, fairly carried out, would lead to very singular and ludicrous consequences. But we forbear to trace them.

To take leave of this head of our subject, on which we have perhaps bestowed already too much time. Phrenology has been pushed to some extent among the animals inferior to man, but has not yet, as far as we are informed, been applied, with much effect, to the exposition of the propensities and other mental qualities of the insect race. On whatever classes, however, it has been brought fairly to bear, it has been found as true in relation to them, as to the human race. This appears clearly from the superb work of Dr. Vimont on Comparative Phrenology, one of the most interesting productions of the age. Nor are we inclined to doubt, that it will

be found hereafter as applicable to insects and reptiles, as to the higher orders of animated nature. Indeed under the present organization and endowment of the animal kingdom, we deem it, as already mentioned, scarcely possible for the case to be otherwise. In those humbler ranks of being, muscles, joints, stomachs, teeth, claws, and respiratory and generative organs serve the same purposes as in the more elevated. Each apparatus, moreover, is fitted precisely to the form, character, and mode of life of the animal possessing it. And, in the progress of our knowledge of nature, the same will, no doubt, be discovered to be true of the brain. In each species and variety of the insect and reptile tribes, where that organ exists at all, its special aptitude to the modes of subsistence and action of the beings endowed with it, will be found to be complete. But we repeat, that, in making these remarks, we are not, perhaps, fully backed by what Phrenology has yet done. Our errors, therefore, should we fall into any, are not to be charged to the discredit of the science. They are to be treated as our own. Nor is there any fairness in attempting to derive objections against Phrenology from the mental phenomena of the insect races, except so far as the science may have spoken of them. Has it committed any mistakes respecting them? If so, let them be cited and exposed, and, as far as they may avail, they will weaken its claim to *entire* credibility—they will show, at least, that it is not yet perfect. But it is unjust to ransack, for objections to it, a department of nature, into which its researches have not yet been carried. Its basis is *observation*; and that has not yet been pushed into every department of the animal kingdom. It will be soon enough to test the truth of Phrenology by the lower orders of animals, when it shall have included them in its researches. To attempt this at present, is *premature*, and comports perfectly with the *uniform injustice* the science has sustained from the measures of its opponents. On this ground, therefore, we might, without being chargeable with shrinking from the contest, have declined replying to our author's objections drawn from the

mental phenomena of insects. Phrenology is answerable only for what it *has* done, or *attempted* to do, not for what it *has not* done or attempted. The gentleman's remarks on insects and spiders, therefore, which he has made and bruited with such an air of triumph, and seems to think so withering to our science, are out of joint and quite *innocent*—certainly they injure nothing but his own reputation and that of his philosophy.

Into the scale opposed to Phrenology, our author has thrown the name and authority of Dr. Prichard, of England, and seems to consider them surpassingly ponderous. Nor are we inclined to deny them their due weight. With us, however, names pass for nothing *but* names, and opinions but for opinions. We estimate their value and authority only by the amount of *fact* they carry along with them. Dr. Prichard, we are told, by the writer of the Article, acknowledges the *inferiority in size* of the African brain—its inferiority, we mean, to the brain of the Caucasian. Yet, relying, not on his own observation, which, in relation to that point, seems to have been very limited, but on intelligence collected from West India planters, and practitioners of medicine, he pronounces the intellect (meaning, we presume, the *native capacity*) of the negro equal in all respects to that of the white-man. Of course, under equal cultivation, the African and the Caucasian ought to attain the same rank in all that depends on the products of mind. To the respectability of Dr. Prichard, as a writer, we cheerfully testify. On the score of erudition, and general information, few members of the Profession surpass him. Of the depth of his researches, however, and the soundness of his views in natural, physiological, and psychological science, we cannot speak so favourably. In those points we think him wanting; and, we need hardly add, that, as respects the philosophy of human nature, or rather his fitness to expound it, such knowledge is *indispensable*.

The Doctor has written a large and elaborate work, on the history and philosophy of man, in which, as just observed,

among many statements of a similar caste, he has asserted the *intellectual equality* of the African and the Caucasian. But he has *only* asserted it. He has neither proved it, nor rendered it plausible. The gloss of *popularity*, founded on *prejudice*, is all he has been able to bestow on it; and that it is so perishable, that it cannot abide the finger of scrutiny. In fact, *popularity* of opinion, in times of excitement, and on subjects that appeal to feeling more than to judgment, is too generally synonymous with *fallacy* of opinion. In a word, the Doctor's work is a failure, as has been shown in a review of it, published in New York, in 1829, in a small volume, entitled, "Thoughts on the Unity of the Human Race." It is there made appear, that Dr. Prichard is unacquainted with the full extent of the cerebral and other differences of the two races; at least that he has not correctly stated them. Not only is the brain of the African smaller and therefore feeblar than the brain of the Caucasian; it is also worse balanced, its animal compartment, being much more preponderant over its intellectual and moral. This is so striking, as to show itself on the slightest examination and comparison of the heads of the two races. From this cause, the brain being the ruling organ of the system, the African has in him far more of the animal and less of the man than the Caucasian, and is therefore less fit for an elevated and comprehensive sphere of action. In fact, some of the African tribes, especially the Boschese-men, and certain castes of the natives of Oceanica do not appear to approach nearer to the Caucasians, than the Golok does to them. We speak from *observation*—not hearsay or conjecture. Nor do we mean what we say to have any reference to man's *origin*. We speak of him as we find him *now*. But, for views on this subject expressed more fully, accompanied by the facts by which they are sustained, we refer those, who are curious in respect to it, to the work just cited.

In that production it is shown, we think satisfactorily, that the Negro race has never produced a truly *great man*, either in the capacity of a moralist, an artist, a lawgiver, or a sage. Like other races, it has its grades and castes; and it has giv-

en birth to *great Negroes*. But a first rate negro can scarcely rank with a third or fourth rate whiteman—perhaps still lower. No real African community has ever risen of itself above barbarism—scarcely above savagism. Three or four centuries ago, the inhabitants of Western and Central Africa were in about the same condition with some of the northern hordes, when they invaded and overthrew the Roman empire. And they are in that condition still, having made no progress, during so long a period, in the arts of civilization. Far different, however, is the case with the descendants of the northern barbarians. They are now the best cultivated and the most enlightened portion of the human family. For this there must be a deep-rooted cause; and it is to be looked for and found in the constitutional differences of the two races. True; we are told that the people of Africa have had no opportunities or means of improvement. They have had neither books to read, learned and wise men to converse with and be counselled by, paintings and statuary to admire, study, imitate, and improve by, agriculture and manufactures to take example from and practise, nor architectural monuments to build after. All this is true; but why have they not had such things? The cause is in themselves, not in external and prohibiting circumstances. A period has doubtless existed, when the Caucasian race was as barbarous and uninstructed, and as destitute of any artificial means of instruction, as the African. Previously to the era of their own writing of books, producing of men of learning and wisdom, executing of paintings and statuary, and erecting costly and elegant edifices, they possessed none of those fruits and means of improvement. The reason is plain. There was no parent people, from whom they could inherit them. But they had within themselves, derived from the favouring munificence of nature, that which enabled them to effect all these things; to become themselves, we mean, the parents of the products and sources of cultivation just enumerated. Hence, in progress of time, they were supplied with them, as the issue of their own genius and industry. And so would the

African race, had nature endowed them with equal talents, and dispositions to employ them. No reason but a want of such talents and dispositions can be assigned for the great and uniform inferiority of the negroes to the whites. Had nature placed the two races on a par, in relation to intellect, and morals, their bodily powers being, as they are, nearly equal, it is not possible, that, in the round of events, some community of the former would not have had an ascendancy over some like community of the latter. A phenomenon of the kind, however, has never presented itself, and would be considered anomalous and wonderful, were it now to occur. Wherever found in societies by themselves, Africans are as uniformly inferior to Caucasians, as apes and monkeys are to them—and, we believe, by as immutable a law. And when the two races are mingled in the same society, the Caucasian superiority is still more striking. For all this, we repeat, there must be a deep-rooted cause. And it is found in the *native inferiority* of the African Intellect.

Between the Caucasians and the other races of men there exists one very remarkable difference, which does not appear to be sufficiently noticed and appreciated, if indeed it has been noticed at all, by those who have undertaken to investigate the subject. To the progress of the Caucasians in the arts of civilization, there seems to be no limit. Each succeeding generation shoots ahead of preceding ones, with such certainty and regularity, that their capacity to improve appears indefinite. Hence the high and brilliant condition to which the race has already attained, and the boundless prospect of farther improvement still unfolding to them. The Africans present a very different aspect. Advancing to a given point, scarcely beyond the limit of savagism, if beyond it at all, there they stop, and there remain, from century to century, without progressing a step farther in the march of civilization. As far as is known, the inhabitants of Central and Western Africa, as has been already intimated, are as barbarous and uncultivated now, as they were five hundred years ago. As respects the Caucasians, a fact to

which reference has been also made, the case is different. Within the period just cited, they have revolutionized the face of a large portion of the globe. Europe is immensely changed and ameliorated in its condition, and America is converted from a rude wilderness into a cultivated world. The cause is plain. The Caucasians, we repeat, have within themselves an ever-living and exhaustless fountain of improvement, which is denied to the other races. Reduce a community of them to an uncultivated condition, their native powers remaining, and place it in a solitude, where only Nature and her works abide, without books, or any of the other products of civilization, and it will, in the lapse of time, become again cultivated. From such a state of degradation, in which the race must, at some remote period have found itself, the Caucasians have attained their present standing. The reason, we say, is manifest. They have a capacity to read the book of nature, which is constantly open to them, interpret its pages, and turn to their improvement and benefit the matter it contains. But of such capacity the Africans are destitute; at least they possess it in a very limited degree. Hence their deficiencies. Select a colony of the most cultivated Africans in the United States or the West Indies, only let it be *full-blooded*, and plant it in the heart of their native land, entirely apart from Caucasian influence, and, instead of advancing in cultivation and improvement, it will retrograde and degenerate. In a few generations it will return to barbarism. Such, we seriously apprehend, will be the backward and downward course of the Liberian colony, with all the aid the whites can give it. There is reason to fear, if not to believe, that, *as a community*, the colonists are *not improving—and the condition of man is never stationary*.

The island of St. Domingo presents a melancholy picture of the want of intellect and general efficiency in the African race. We say "general efficiency"; for the moral, social, and personal conditions of the present population of that once splendid colony are all deteriorated. From the mental deficiency of those who occupy it, a spot on which nature has bestowed,

in profusion, her choicest bounties, and which, when cultivated and governed by Caucasians, was the paradise and pride of the American seas—from this cause, we say, that garden-spot of the western hemisphere is fast declining from its Caucasian splendour, into a comparative desert. Agricultural and commercial industry and enterprise are at an end; and, instead of the lively and flourishing aspect, which the island once presented, there is little seen in it now but unproductive fields, dilapidating edifices, half depopulated towns and cities, warehouses empty and sinking into ruins, harbours deserted by their shipping, and a people ignorant and degraded, indolent and wretched. And this desolation, we say again, can be traced directly to the native inferiority of the African mind. Yet no little aid is derived there, in the superintendence and management of affairs, as well from the counsels, as the example of Caucasians. Were St. Domingo secluded entirely from Caucasian influence, we have cause to apprehend, that the barbarism of its inhabitants would soon be complete. And, were it not for the abundant productiveness of the soil and climate, almost without cultivation or care, famine would aid in the depopulation of the island. Nor, from present appearances, is there reason to believe, that, in future years, when the African population shall have attained the sovereignty in the other West India Islands, their condition will be any better.

That the negro is entitled to his *personal* freedom, we are neither prepared nor inclined to deny. As soon, therefore, as it can be done with safety, let the shackles of his slavery be stricken off. But, from the best estimate we have been able to form of his character and competencies, after having attentively observed and faithfully studied him, for many years, we are convinced of his *unfitness* for *political* freedom. He can subsist in peace and comfort only under some form of *positive* if not *despotic* rule. He has not intellect sufficient to enable him to frame and administer a system of wise and salutary laws, for the government of himself and others in a *large community*. And he has too much of the *animal* in him,

to be a peaceful, industrious, and orderly citizen, except as the result of actual compulsion. We speak of the Africans *as a race*, without regard to *individual exceptions*, which could not materially modify the result. However heterodox this sentiment may be *deemed*, and however unpopular it may *actually be*, at present, time and experience will prove it to be true. And the whole matter is explicable on phrenological principles. The cerebral development of the negro is in fault. The animal compartment of his brain is too preponderant for the purposes of true political freedom.

We have admitted that the African race are entitled to their *personal* freedom. There are not wanting, however, grave considerations, which render the correctness of this sentiment, in its full extent, more perhaps than doubtful. Man is a moral and social, as well as an individual being. In other words, he is a *human being*, no less than an *animal*. He was formed and intended, therefore, to be as useful as practicable both to himself and to others, which necessarily includes his doing to himself and others, the least possible harm. Men form and maintain societies, as well on account of the mutual benefits thus secured, as from the strength and permanency of their social feelings. In every community, therefore, the most effectual rules and regulations for the attainment of these ends should be adopted and reduced to practice. Those who will not perform their duty to themselves and others *voluntarily*, should be compelled to do it; and those inclined to the commission of vice should be restrained. These are propositions not likely, we think, to be seriously controverted. And they apply to Africans as well as to Caucasians. They apply even to the inferior animals, which ought to be turned to the most useful purposes, to which they are, or can be rendered, competent. In what does the highest usefulness of man, as a member of society, consist? The answer is easy. In steady, persevering, and well directed industry, corporeal, or mental, or both, according to the characters and competencies of individuals, and the wants of the community. Let the African be fairly tried and judged of

on these principles, and we strongly apprehend, that he will be found unfit for the enjoyment of entire personal freedom—such freedom, we mean, as may be safely and usefully possessed by the Caucasian.

That the African race, *as a people*, can, *without compulsion*, be rendered industrious, beyond the pressure and gratification of their immediate wants—that they can be thus induced to struggle for independence, by laying up a supply of the products of their industry, for future contingences, and as a means of raising them to consequence and influence, and equalizing them with the Caucasian race, is a problem yet to be demonstrated. And facts have been hitherto unfavourable to its affirmation. The fallen condition of the island of St. Domingo, as already mentioned, is in direct opposition to it. So, as all facts concur to inform us, is the already changed and still further changing condition of the island of Jamaica. Since the Abolition Act went into operation there, the negroes are represented as becoming discontented and refractory, and sinking into idleness, instead of growing more orderly and exemplary, and rising in industry, to improve their condition. This representation has reached us so often, and through so many respectable channels, that we do not feel justified in questioning its correctness. And of a great majority of the manumitted Africans in the United States, it cannot be denied that the same is true. Their condition and characters are both deteriorated, by the attainment of their freedom. Of the correctness of this latter statement, abundant testimony is furnished by the conduct and condition of liberated Africans in Philadelphia and New York.

From upper Canada evidence to the same effect has reached us. Some years ago, two or three colonies of manumitted negroes from the United States were planted there, under the most favourable and promising circumstances. The colonists were supplied, on easy terms, with excellent land and all the implements requisite for cultivating it. By the government of the country the same rights and privileges, personal, civil, and political, were vested in them, as in European and other

white settlers. By industry, perseverance, and economy, it was in their power to be comfortable from the beginning, and, in time, to become independent, and perhaps wealthy. But how different is their condition already! and it is still growing worse. As a people they are idle, poor, vicious, and miserable—and of course discontented and despised. Many of them are selling their lands, on which they have made few if any improvements, with a view to return to the United States, or wander somewhere else. They amalgamate with the Indians, and conform to their slovenly and indolent habits; much more readily than with whitemen.

About the same periods, settlements on adjacent lands of similar qualities, were made by the *lowest orders* of emigrants from Ireland and Scotland. Of these settlers many were poorer and worse supplied with agricultural implements than the negroes. Their condition however now is widely different. They are nearly all comfortable, many of them independent, and some of them growing rich. And what has made them so? Steady industry, and a laudable economy. These facts speak a language not to be misunderstood; and it is unfavourable to the fitness of the Africans for freedom.

We are aware that the sentiments here expressed are in opposition to those that generally prevail on this subject. Nor do we say that they are fully entertained by the Phrenological School. Though Phrenology satisfactorily accounts for the mental inferiority of the African race that exists *at present*, and has existed since the earliest period of history, by showing a deficiency in their moral and intellectual organs, and a predominance of their animal ones, the professors of that science, as a body, do not, we believe, maintain, that that inferiority will necessarily be permanent. As far as we are informed, they have no where contended, that education will not remove it. Should the sentiment we have advanced, therefore, prove erroneous, the responsibility of it rests on ourselves; and we cheerfully assume it.

As already intimated, we believe, and have long believed, after the most deliberate examination of the subject, that no

form or degree of education that man can bestow, aided by all other *earthly* causes, can ever raise the African to a level with the Caucasian mind. And assuredly all experiments hitherto made are in favour of the belief. By no training he could receive has any African ever been made great—great, we mean, according to the Caucasian standard. True; we are told that some of the *brown* men of Jamaica and other West India islands, who have been well educated, have shown intellectual *cleverness*. To *that* height they may have risen, but no higher. Not one of them has ever attained to any thing approaching intellectual eminence. Nor, if they even had, could our opponents strengthen their hypothesis by the fact—On the contrary, their cause would be injured by the event, rather than benefited. The *brown* men referred to are not *Africans*, but belong to a *mixed race*, which occupies a higher or lower rank, according to its amount of the *Caucasian nature*. Nor can the African ever reach the Caucasian standard,, but by such a mixture. And even the mixture cannot effect a perfect equality, until the African character shall have been worn out. In no instance is the Caucasian *improved* by the blood of the Africans; but the *reverse*. The improvement is uniformly on the part of the latter—precisely as the mule is superior to the ass, but inferior to the horse. Nor has an attempt thus to amend the Caucasian race ever been thought of; while the African race has never been amended in any other way. Hence it does appear that the native and permanent inferiority of the latter cannot be reasonably or even plausibly questioned.

Let it be distinctly understood, that this discussion neither has *necessarily*, nor is *intended* to have, the slightest bearing on either of the questions—the *origin* of man—or the *abolition of slavery*. Such a construction would be equally *forced* and *contrary to our wishes*. Our object is to speak of the African and Caucasian races, as we find them; and we protest against being held responsible for any inferences, except such as we deduce ourselves, or such as flow naturally and necessarily from the premises laid down.

We make these remarks to guard against the misconstructions and wanton injustice, by which we have been often assailed.

When an argument is so sound and clear, that it cannot be met by a *counter* argument, the practice of the day is to endeavour to destroy its influence by some false construction, or sinister inference. Thus is prejudice arrayed against reason, and prevarication or falsehood brought into collision with truth. A prevailing disposition of the day is that of equalization. To such an extent is this carried by some persons, as to amount almost to a *Procrustean bed*. Hence, when a writer contends, that the Caucasian race is *constitutionally* superior to the African, he is pronounced an *aristocrat*, an *immoralist*, or an infidel—or, in some other way, unsound in his sentiments, and dangerous in his example. Instead of being met by argument and manly discussion, he is assailed with charges against the purity of his motives, and the tendencies of his opinions. The *truth* of his doctrines is disregarded. The struggle is for *victory*, not for *science*.

But this not all, nor perhaps even the strongest evidence that can be adduced, in favour of the opinion for which we are contending. Wherever it is populated by negroes, the continent of Africa testifies conclusively to the same result. Though by nature one of the most productive portions of the globe, and capable of yielding boundless wealth, under skilful cultivation, it is but little better than a wilderness, and a land of poverty. Yet it has been the residence of its peculiar race, for thousands of years. And, for its rude and desolate state it is indebted exclusively to the ignorance and indolence that degrade them, and their grovelling content under a bare subsistence. Nor does it appear practicable to elevate their views perhaps by *any means*, or amend their condition except by compulsion. Had they task-masters over them, who would force them to labour, allowing them, as their reward, a fair proportion of the products of their industry, not only would they be more useful to others; their personal comforts would be greatly multiplied and improved.

In a special manner, though we confidently believe that they could never, as a branch of the human family, be made to attain either rank or influence, they might be rescued from the domination of some of their brutal and vicious practices. They might be taught at least to abandon the unnatural and nefarious traffic of selling one another into hopeless slavery, and to subsist on the product of unforbidden industry. As has been said respecting St. Domingo, nothing but the spontaneous productiveness of Africa, renders it habitable to the negro race. Did human subsistence *there* require the same degree of industry and economy it does in Europe and many parts of America, famine would soon do the work of desolation.

We have been often told that the state of slavery, in which the negroes of the United States have been immersed for many generations, is the cause of their inferiority to the whites, in native capacity. Were this the case, it might be fairly employed, as a strong argument in defence of Phrenology. But we have two reasons for not availing ourselves of it. *It is not true*; and Phrenology neither needs nor admits in its support any *spurious* or equivocal matter. Truth alone is congenial to it, and is sufficient for its establishment.

The negroes that were originally imported into the United States had not been *slaves* in Africa, though they had been under perhaps a stern despotic government, which they had not the talent and energy to throw off. Wherefore then were they deficient in capacity at that period? for that they *were* deficient is not to be questioned. They were inferior even to their descendants born in the United States. A fair comparison gave proof of this. Under slavery they improved in native intellect rather than deteriorated. The reason is plain. In the performance of their tasks their brains were more excited and more effectually thrown into action, than they would have been, in a state of savage indolence, in the wilds of Africa. And as we have already stated, the brain is improved in vigour and activity by exercise, in common with every other part of the body—and becomes a better instrument for the operations of the mind.

By careful cultivation, then, through successive generations, the African brain and concomitant mental capacity can be improved. But there is no reason to believe that they can be raised to an equality with those of the Caucasian. Individually we feel confident that they never can. Come from what source it may, the inequality between the races cannot be removed by *earthly means*. No form or degree of training can give to the brain of the negro the size, strength, and balance of parts, that are possessed by the brain of the white man.

Since the foregoing pages were written, we have seen a letter from the author of the Article in the Christian Examiner, published in the March number, 1835, of the New England Magazine, which, if possible, is more offensive and contemptible as a production, and more insulting to Phrenology and its advocates, than the Article itself. It audaciously charges the Phrenological School with *infidelity, impiety, and foolishness!*—the imputations to be dealt out, we presume, and appropriated to the members individually, according to the author's views of their demerits. For he admits that *all* Phrenologists are not "necessarily irreligious men." But, in making this admission, he fairly implies, that those who are not "*irreligious*," are fools; for he again asserts, that he "cannot but regard it" (Phrenology) as "*foolish and impious*." Again; "I am well aware," says he, "that though this system (Phrenology) has spread *chiefly* among *infidels*, it has also been embraced by many *professors* and even *teachers* of religion." Of course, all the latter, if not *hypocrites*, and therefore "*impious*," are necessarily "*foolish*." Once more. "Could the *half-reasoning* Phrenologist discern the remoter bearings of his own system, he would arrive at conclusions utterly irreconcilable with its (Christianity's) high philosophy."—Arrogant sciolist! to conceit that he can descry "bearings" beyond the ken of all Phrenologists, many of whose keen and searching vision is to his purblindness, as the eye of the eagle to that of the screech-owl! Having assailed Phrenologists in these and other terms of like indignity,

he has the impudence to observe (as if his tongue were still pure and his pen unpolluted;)

“As to abuse and vilification” (in reply to his pasquinade) “I have nothing to apprehend on that score. In the hands of *respectable* opponents, such weapons are never found; and in the hands of any other they are powerless.”

Indeed!—then, taken in connexion with its context in the Letter and the Article, this clause is a commentary on itself and its author, which no words of ours could strengthen. The gentleman’s “abuse and vilification” of Phrenology and its disciples are emphatically “powerless.” He has shown himself any thing but a “*respectable* opponent.” On this point, therefore, we leave him under his own suicidal ban.

Plunging once more into *bathos*, *cant* and *mysticism*, which, next to prevarication and abuse, he most delights in, the Rev. gentleman sketches the following picture of man—a likeness peradventure exclusively of himself drawn by his “consciousness”; for it resembles no one else we have ever beheld. Caliban himself is a less monstrous type of humanity—certainly he is a much more definite and intelligible one.

“Man is something more than an animal of a higher or the highest order; he is likewise an *angelic nature* and a *son of God*.” (We think it is said, on high authority, that man is somewhat “*lower* than the angels.” Nor is it within our recollection, that the Deity, who knows him best, has ever honored him with the epithet “angelic,” or any other resembling it. On what more *intimate knowledge* of him, then, does our author thus apply it? But we pass this by, as the issue of the gentleman’s jaded Ideality.) “There belong to the spirit that dwells within him (man) *whole provinces* and *large kingdoms*, which have nothing to do with his animal nature, or with the faculties that connect him with the outward world.”

Such are the fustian and balderdash, with which this *blustering* compound of rant and conceit assails Phrenologists, and then prates about “*respectable* opponents,” and boasts his disregard of “abuse and vilification,” and the sacred shield of vir-

tue and innocence which protects him from them. This reminds us of the drab in the play, who, after the commission of every act that can degrade woman, clamorously invokes the observance and protection due to female purity and honour!

"There belong to the spirit that dwells within him (man) whole provinces and large kingdoms, which have nothing to do with his animal nature, or with the faculties that connect him with the outward world."!

It was our design, at one time, to make this singular clause the subject of a few remarks; but we feel ourselves compelled to abandon the project. The task is too repulsive. We cannot mingle in a matter so mystically and disgustingly absurd and nonsensical. It is as untangible to analysis, reason, common sense, and every other power belonging to man, as spirit is to our external senses. In the language of a late eccentric character, respecting a man he held in abhorrence, we would not willingly come "near enough it to touch it with a pitch-fork." Our chief aversion toward it arises, in part, from the spirit of cant and fanaticism that dictated it, but more especially from its outrage on truth.

In another point of view the pretensions of the writer are superlatively arrogant. We allude to the reason assigned by him, in his Letter, for writing his Article in the Christian Examiner. As it is scarcely possible for the reader to conceive of such inflated presumptuousness, especially in a creature of powers so limited, we here insert his own "precious confession" on the subject.

"I was anxious to *redeem* a work" (the Christian Examiner) "in whose religious character I am much interested, from the imputation of a philosophy, which appears to me to be irreligious in its tendency."

"I"—yes, even "I," *nameless* as I am, and destitute in an equal degree of power and reputation—"I was anxious to *redeem*"—what? the Christian Examiner, with Channing and Walker and their distinguished associates, marshalled as a wall of fire around it!—and from what was this ably con-

ducted Periodical to be "*redeemed*"? The *curse of irreligion*. The Evil One, eluding the vigilance of the guards, had made his way into this beauteous garden of religious literature, in the form of *Phrenology*, and our sainted and inspired author felt himself commissioned to wage a crusade against him, defeat his usurpation, and purify the consecrated spot from his pollution!

That the length and breadth of the gentleman's arrogance may be the more readily measured, let this point be briefly analyzed. To be in a state to need *redemption*, the thing to be redeemed must be not merely *endangered*, but *lost*. The Christian Examiner, then, though the product of the pens of the most pious and enlightened of the New England clergy, was, notwithstanding, in a *lost condition*. The work of *irreligion* and corruption was complete! To change our figure; the Augean stable was full; and this Jack the giant-killer, turned Hercules *in presumption*, cleansed it of its abominations with a flourish of his pen!

Is it possible, that the Phrenologists of New England, already a very large and respectable body, and daily increasing, will allow themselves to be thus publicly bearded and branded with imputed *infidelity, folly, and impiety*, and still suffer their assailant to strut and swagger in his lion's hide? This can hardly be, while there are other beasts and birds, that *bray, hoot, and cackle* like himself, from whose coverings a more suitable costume may be prepared for him.

But perhaps the most disgusting features of the gentleman's letter remain to be noticed. They are made up of its *affected wisdom, mystified abstractions, and canting meditations*. They are composed, in fact, of things undefinable in words, and which can be made known only by being exhibited. Here are some of them fresh from the workshop of our author's brain, "*breast,*" "*belly,*" "*fingers,*" or "*toes;*" or of whatever other part of his carcass he chooses to designate as the domicile of his mind.

"Truth is not the product of reasoning; if it were, it might be manufactured to any amount, by the mechanical operation

of logic. It is not made by argument—it is a *pure inspiration of the universal reason*"; (what does that mean?) "*no chain of sequences can bind it*"—(and that?)—"no sophistry can loose it." (still unintelligible.) * * * * "To prove, to demonstrate, is not to produce truth." * * * * "In the Phædon of Plato, there are many inconclusive arguments; and yet no believer, I presume, ever read that book, without having his faith in immortality confirmed."

What is the interpretation of all this straining, gasping and panting to appear wise? A word discloses it. Reasoning may discover and fortify truth, but not create it. And who does not know that, without our author's Delphic revelation? Who does not know that truth consists in things *as they are*, not as they may be grouped in logical syllogisms—in things, we mean, as God has made, endowed, and arranged them; not as man may choose to *misrepresent* them? It had been well for the Rev. writer, had he remembered and conformed to this, when he undertook to descant on Phrenology; and we earnestly commend it to him, as a rule of action, during the remainder of his life. Nor ought he, perhaps, as a christian minister, to forget, that "life and immortality are brought to light," and the "believer's faith in them confirmed," not by the Phædon of Plato, but by the writing and preaching of the Evangelists and Apostles—or rather by the teaching of the Messiah himself.

In truth, there is nothing in Phædon *confirmatory* of the immortality of the soul. Though, in the words of Cato, the pagan philosopher "reasoned well" on the subject; still he left it in "shadows, clouds, and darkness," which were dissipated only by the sun of revelation. Though *hope*, which is the "divinity that stirs within us," "points out an hereafter," "and intimates eternity to man,"—and earnestly longs for it, it is far from *proving* it. Whatever display of reading, therefore, the gentleman may have made, by his reference to Plato, he has given but a flimsy manifestation of judgment. And he ought to be aware, that, in these plain common-sense times, a man is estimated much more according to what he says and does himself, than from his knowledge of the doings and sayings of others.

But we can pursue this unpleasant discussion no farther, though many errors and faults in the Article remain untouched. We therefore take leave of it and its Rev. author, unconcerned whether the parting be final or not. Final it certainly is, on our part, as relates to Phrenology, unless his Reverence appear hereafter under his proper signature, and produce something worthy of a reply. Whatever we may be induced to do, with regard to others, neither *his* sophistry nor misrepresentations, denunciation nor abuse, shall again tempt us to notice *them*, even by a glance of our eye.

Injustice toward him we have endeavoured to avoid; and if we have treated him with severity, it is because he deserves it. Whether we have accurately apportioned our chastisement to the measure of his demerit, it is not our purpose very anxiously to inquire. Of that the public is competent to judge; and we are willing to believe that they will do so impartially. One thing is certain; he has causelessly and wantonly insulted and wronged Phrenology and its advocates—a class of men, as heretofore stated, ranking in intellect and morals, science and learning, with the foremost of the age. That he deserves to be rebuked, therefore, will hardly be denied. Yet to administer the rebuke in the terms and manner we deemed suitable, has been repulsive to us. We take no delight in any contest, where harsh charges are preferred, discourteous language employed, or feelings of unfriendliness called into action. On the contrary, such contests are in the highest degree disagreeable to us. Still, however, as often as a sense of duty may summon us to them, we shall not decline them. While, therefore, as Phrenologists, we should infinitely prefer discussing the science calmly and mildly, with such as may oppose it in a similar spirit, and while we pledge ourselves never to depart from strict courtesy, in a discussion of the kind—under these feelings, and with this resolution, we notwithstanding hold ourselves prepared, as often as the conceited daw may annoy us, by pecking and calling names, or the viper by hissing and drivelling its venom in our path, to spurn the one, and tread in-

dignantly on the head of the other. Though we shall in no case be the assailant; yet, when causelessly and rudely attacked, we claim the privilege of carrying the war into the enemy's territory, and defending Rome under the walls of Carthage. An unprovoked and merciless assault not only justifies stern retaliation, but often enjoins it as a duty. It is thus that petty and troublesome meddlers, who are strangers to high and honorable motives, are compelled to keep the peace, from the dread of punishment. Nor should the clerical character ever be suffered to serve as a shield to cover the delinquent. On the contrary, the stain his delinquency, in defiance of the voice of his sacred calling, affixes on religion, magnifies the offender's fault, and deepens its colouring, and justly calls down on him a more unsparing retribution. And when he even desecrates his profession, by converting it into a stronghold and place of annoyance, to injure others, and protect himself in his assaults and malefactions, his offence assumes a character, from which we turn with abhorrence; and on which, from motives of delicacy, we decline bestowing a suitable name. Influenced by these considerations, and regardless of the opinion of any one to the contrary, we feel that we have inflicted no unbecoming or unmerited chastisement on the **REV. DEFAMER OF PHRENOLOGY AND ITS ADVOCATES.**

